Meiji Japan, Ottoman Egypt, and the British Occupation: A Turn of the Century Colonial Triangle of Non-Western Modernity and Anti-Colonial Egyptian Nationalism

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Abstract
The independent Japanese nation-state of the late 19th century, with its modern institutions and its enlightened officials, became a powerful role model for other non-Western societies who struggled to acquire the trappings of modernity they often associated with the West – parliamentary constitutionalism, universal compulsory education, and patriotic love of homeland, for example. Under British occupation since 1882, Egyptian nationalists in late Ottoman Egypt looked to this Japanese example in formulating their anti-colonial resistance ideologies. After Japan’s dramatic victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the pages of the Egyptian nationalist press were full of articles arguing for a British withdrawal in order to facilitate independent Egyptian nationhood. The authors of these anti-colonial demands used the Japanese example as a discursive tool to highlight their particular strategies for liberating Egypt. But a question arises: could an “Eastern” nation such as Japan, which served as an exemplary nation-state for other “Easterners” to emulate, also be acknowledged as colonialist? Or was colonialism at this time only understood as a by-product of Western imperialism to suit the needs of Egyptians, allowing them to deploy the Japanese model rhetorically, with knowing regard for Japanese colonial endeavors in East Asia?

Keywords: Meiji Japan, Ottoman Egypt, modernity, nationalism, imperialism, colonialism
With the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Japanese islands tucked away in East Asia broke out of relative isolation to soon become a major player on the international stage. The independent Japanese nation-state, now with its modern institutions and its enlightened officials, also became a powerful role model for other non-Western societies in the late 19th century who struggled to acquire the trappings of modernization they often associated with the West. Like many of their Ottoman brethren, whether reforming members of the Young Turk movement or Arabist “proto-nationalists” in the provinces, Egyptian nationalists also looked to the Japanese example. Egyptians persistently referred to modern Japan and its people as a model nation-state whose constitutional government and universal, compulsory education system had been established through the perseverance of its elites – statesmen and intellectuals who were seen to be motivated primarily by a profound sense of patriotic love for the homeland. For late Ottoman Egypt, modern Japan was the country to emulate in order to achieve national liberation.

Egyptian discourse on Japan differed from that of their Ottoman counterparts, however, due to their experience of direct resistance against the British occupation. British forces had arrived in Egypt in 1882 to suppress Egyptian army Colonel Ahmad ‘Urabi’s rebellion against the hereditary Ottoman Khedive Tawfiq and the country’s reliance upon European advisors. The British exiled the rebellion’s leaders to Ceylon and assumed control of the administration. Several international and domestic events served to solidify Egyptian anti-colonial resistance to the British presence in Egypt, which endured far into the 20th century. As one British expatriate later recalled, Japan’s dramatic victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, and the Ottoman-British military confrontation over administrative control of the Sinai Peninsula in 1906, were compounded by the

1 See Renée Worringer, Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 219-250.
British-Egyptian incident at the village of Dinshaway in the same year, which resulted in the controversial execution of several Egyptian peasants. For at least a decade after those clashes took place, the pages of the Egyptian nationalist press were full of articles arguing for a British evacuation in order to facilitate independent Egyptian nationhood. The authors of these anti-colonial demands for British withdrawal used the Japanese example as a discursive tool to make their point, with individual writers focusing upon different aspects of the Japanese nation to highlight their particular strategies for establishing an independent Egypt in the future. Ultimately, however, they all shared in their aspiration to achieve self-determination, free of British control.

The late 19th and early 20th centuries were eras informed by widely accepted ideas of Social Darwinism, an ontological division in the world between monolithic categories of “East” and “West,” and the hegemonic belief in a hierarchy of racially distinct nations whose abilities in the realm of civilization depended upon the character and morality of their respective peoples. In addition, many colonized peoples of the East, Egyptian nationalists included, were drawn to the intellectualized notions of Western progress and civilization in the early 20th century. These principles were believed to be the most fruitful of instruments for enabling power – political power to rule as entitled elites, to modernize and to reform, to steer the masses, as well as national power to establish and preserve sovereignty and to gain international recognition as an independent country. In this early phase of Egyptian anti-colonial nationalism, the signifiers of modernity – those attributes of the modern nation-state that were recognizable as the instruments of power for a particular nation, that guaranteed its independence, its ability to defend itself forcefully or to conquer another – were still overwhelmingly understood by nationalists as originating in and cultural possessions of “the West”, to be borrowed and applied accordingly by “the East.” In other words, at the turn of the 20th century, the West dictated the measure of modernity; Eastern nations had to conform to these standards while not losing what was considered

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their unique “essence,” or else be denied a place in the world of modern nationhood altogether. Rejecting these hegemonic conceptions of progress and civilization proved an insurmountable task while under the twin pressures of European imperial might combined with Western claims of rational scientific superiority.

Implicit in this historical moment was a paradox: for those peoples directly experiencing occupation by European empires, such as Egypt under British occupation, both Western-inspired progress, as well as colonialism, were perceived as the preserve of the West. For Egypt, to diminish this conflict between the West serving as a pattern for modernity as well as being the colonizers (whether France or Britain for example), Meiji Japan functioned as an “Eastern mediator”. The Japanese had accessed this modern progress. They had seemingly accomplished the task of modernizing along Western lines while preserving their indigenous Japanese heritage. In one sense Meiji Japan delivered a way out of this colonial dilemma for Egypt, though it would not be without an increasingly obvious contradiction in the nationalist discourse.

The various Egyptian anti-colonial nationalist perspectives which evoked the model of modern Japan were further complicated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 which had bound the two island nations of Britain and Japan together militarily. Egyptian nationalist writings idealized Japan on the one hand, while simultaneously demonizing Meiji Japan’s ally, the British occupier, on the other. The question must be posed: could an “Eastern” nation such as Japan, which served as an exemplary nation-state for other “Easterners,” also be recognized as colonialist at this time?

This nexus of Egyptian nationalists, British occupation in Egypt, and Egyptian idealization of Meiji Japan generated what I regard as a “colonial triangle” which calls into question the meaning of anti-colonialism for non-Western peoples striving to achieve national liberation in the early 20th century. Within the understanding of modernity as overcoming obstacles such as colonial occupation to reach independent nationhood, there was not yet a form of “universalized anti-colonialism” at this time (I define universalized anti-colonialism ideally as a resistance which disregards an imperial overlord’s race, ethnicity, or religion). Was colonialism
only understood as a by-product of Western imperialism to suit the needs of Egyptians at the time, in order to rhetorically deploy the Japanese model, with knowing regard for Japanese colonial endeavors in East Asia? To answer this question, Egypt’s historical experience of foreign invasions, their effects upon Egyptian identity, and nationalist discourse on modern Japan all inform our understanding of Egyptian anti-colonial views of modernity and colonialism in the early 20th century, as well as Egypt’s perceived place in the world.

History and Egyptian Identity to the 20th Century

Egypt’s historic role as a center of Islamic culture and learning since the early Arab conquests connected it to the lands and peoples of Muslim Asia just as geographic proximity to Europe as a North African territory on the Mediterranean linked Egypt to the trajectory of Western civilization and thought. With the Ottoman conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, the lands of the Nile were incorporated into the Ottoman state as a province vital to the economic well-being and political stability of the Empire. In the aftermath of Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, the Ottoman Albanian official Mehmet Ali was dispatched to Cairo to restore order. As a Francophile modernizer, Mehmet Ali undertook a radical development program in the first decades of the 19th century which advanced Egypt as a socio-economic entity more distinct from and sometimes rivalling the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-19th century Mehmet Ali was able to secure political autonomy and the right to the hereditary governorship of Ottoman Egypt for his descendants, the consequences of which shaped Egyptian national identity immeasurably in the 20th century. The Ottoman ruling elite in Egypt thus came to consist of Turco-Circassian, Armenian, and other non-Egyptian minorities that were sufficiently alienated from the Egyptian Arab populace to cause army officer ‘Urabi and his native Egyptian cabal of followers to attempt to overthrow the Khedives (the royal “Egyptian” family, Mehmet Ali’s descendants) in 1879. The British occupation

which ensued in 1882 after the failed coup was a measure initially intended as a short-term policy to stabilize the countryside and protect the Suez Canal, the strategic waterway built with French investment and opened in 1869 which facilitated British access to its colonies of India, Australia, and New Zealand. The occupation remained the reality in Egypt however until the final departure of British forces in 1956.

Consequently, Egyptians in the late 19th and early 20th centuries developed a national consciousness quite specific to Egyptian heritage and geography that was unlike identity in the other Ottoman Arab provinces. As was typical of most organic nationalist movements influenced by European Romanticism at the end of the 19th century, a people’s “natural” bond that defined them as a nation required both a clearly delineated antiquity as well as a continuity of shared cultural experience from that ancient beginning. There was a recognition among local Egyptians that Egypt had been subject to frequent waves of invasion and colonization by foreign elements throughout ancient, medieval and modern history. The Egyptian nationalists’ ethos, derived from this historical narrative of repeated alien occupations, evolved into one bound up in the local peasantry, the fellaheen, the true Egyptians who spoke an indigenous Arabic dialect, not Turkish, French or English as a native language. They were the living testament to Egypt’s continuity through the ages: the people who had always inhabited Egypt, the tillers of Egyptian soil who became the repository of Egyptian national identity in the 20th century. They had lived and worked the lands along the Nile; they became a metaphor of Egyptian authenticity, a symbol employed by anti-colonial Egyptian political activists who demanded the immediate evacuation of British occupation forces in a bid

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7 Starting with Persian, Ptolemaic (Greek), Roman, and Byzantine antiquity, subsequent occupiers along the Nile Valley included the conquering Muslim armies from Arabia, the later Shi‘i Fatimid dynasty that emerged first in northwest Africa, then the famous Muslim Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi (Saladin, a Kurd) who settled in Egypt while continuing to battle Crusader armies in the Levant. His Ayyubid descendants maintained control in Cairo in the 12th -13th centuries until their Turkic military slave commanders assumed the throne for themselves and founded the Mamluk Sultanate around 1250; the Ottomans, Napoleon, and the British were the final foreign intrusions.
or Egyptian self-determination. Most significantly, Pharaonic blood, it was claimed, ran through their veins. They were the direct descendants of the greatest genius Egypt had ever known: the Pharaohs of Egypt, whose sophisticated civilization of previous millennia was physically preserved in the enduring structures of the pyramids that towered above the Cairo horizon, serving daily to remind Egyptians of their nation’s former glory as “mother of the world” (umm al-dunya). For local Egyptians whose religious affiliations were either Sunni Muslim (the majority) or Coptic Christian (a minority), the Pharaonic past provided a pre-Islamic, non-sectarian national antiquity, which, in combination with the belief in an “uninterrupted” Egyptian existence in the Nile Valley, reached across religious boundaries to produce relative unity in and dedication towards the newly conceived modern Egyptian nation.

Egyptian national identity at this time was thus internalized as being distinct from “Ottoman” or “Arab.” Following the failure of the ‘Urabi revolt, the British occupation made Ottoman political authority in Egypt obsolete, though Egypt was still considered an Ottoman province. Among Egyptians, the pan-Islamic connection to the Ottoman state remained, though it was little more than a symbolic alternative to foreign imperial control that did not contradict territorial Egyptian identity. This attitude toward the Ottoman Empire had even less to do with an affinity among Egyptians for their Arab brethren in Ottoman lands.

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10 The voluminous discourse on Japan produced by Syrian Muslim and Christian émigrés in Egypt is not explored here. See Worringen, *Ottomans Imagining Japan…*, 235-250.


defined as a particular nation within the Ottoman polity and had been forcibly detached from it by British occupation. Egyptian nationalists merely disagreed with one another as to what would be Egypt’s future political relationship with the Ottoman state. For Mustafa Kāmil’s Watanī Party, the Ottoman Sultan and state were considered capable of liberating Egypt from its colonial shackles in a show of pan-Islamic solidarity; for Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid’s rival Umma Party, Egypt’s interests were best served by a territorially conceived secular nationalism that would include Muslims and Copts in its conception and that rejected an Islamic connection to the Ottoman Empire as a basis for political action.

Their Egyptian Arab identity already firmly entrenched, discourse produced by Egyptian nationalists was a dual exercise aimed at dislodging what was believed to be the greatest obstacle standing in the way of Egypt’s emergence as a progressive nation-state – the British occupation – as well as determining the appropriate state-building measures or societal organizing principles as a strategy for achieving an independent Egypt. Aspiring to recapture former Egyptian greatness, this time in the modern era through a new synthesis of East and West, the model for Egyptian nationalists in this process was Meiji Japan (as it was for many Indian nationalists).14

**Japan and Eastern Modernity**15

Ottoman Turkish and Arabic newspapers started to run columns on Japanese history, politics, culture, and international relations occasionally in the 1870s and 1880s. Interest in the Japanese nation noticeably spiked with the onset of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and continued after the surprising victory of Japan over its much larger adversary, China, in 1895.16 As tensions rose in Asia over Japanese and Russian competition


for control of Manchuria at the turn of the 20th century, Ottoman Turkish and Arabic newspapers seized the opportunity to indulge readers in every aspect of Japanese life, whether that of the Emperor and his modernizing statesmen, their reform initiatives, the foundations of the Japanese constitutional monarchy, the moral and spiritual character of the Japanese, the so-called responsibilities of the nation’s women, or the upbringing of its next generation of patriots, Japanese children. News of the impending conflict with Russia, the Ottomans’ most unrelenting enemy from the late 17th century onwards, provided additional impetus to study Japanese foreign policy and involvement with European powers to glean ideas on how to combat Western encroachment in Ottoman lands. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, countless newspaper and journal articles, books, pamphlets, and poetry were published that represented Japan as an exemplary Eastern nation which had successfully preserved both its sovereignty and its indigenous customs while assimilating from the West the knowledge and technology necessary to become a modern nation-state. Japan, it was often reiterated, could now deliver modernity to the less fortunate Eastern peoples of the world. Meiji Japan and the Japanese were examples to be emulated by Asians and Africans everywhere: an Eastern trope of modernity, the awakened Japanese nation was metaphorically denoted as “the Rising Sun.” Each writer assigned their own set of meanings to Japan to legitimate their views of how to become modern, regardless of Japanese historical realities or contrasting arguments made by others who similarly used Japan as a referent for modernity.

What made the metaphor of modern Japan so appealing? Elites in the Ottoman Empire, including Egyptian nationalists, were not immune to the radical social climate of the day in which European intellectual influences such as Comptean Positivism (with its rationalizing, secular conceptions of history), Social Darwinism (emphasizing the evolutionary processes in human society), or Ernst Renan’s ideas on the intrinsic inferiority of Semitic (Arab) peoples (of course excluding ancient Egyptian civilization!) underpinned the understanding of a linear progression into a secular,

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Western-style nation-state.\textsuperscript{17} Gustave Le Bon, who traveled at the behest of the French government throughout Asia on horseback to study civilizations and subsequently wrote positively of Arab civilization in his \textit{La Civilisation des Arabes} [The Civilization of the Arabs, 1884], was another European polymath whose writings on social psychology were tremendously influential. His \textit{Les lois psychologiques de l’évolution des peuples} [The Psychological Laws of the Evolution of Peoples, 1894] and \textit{Psychologie des foules} [Psychology of Crowds, 1895] were translated into Arabic and Turkish and were widely read in the region.\textsuperscript{18} Both Le Bon and Renan argued that cultural determinism created a global racial hierarchy of societies that were superior (Indo-Europeans), average (Turks, Chinese, Japanese), inferior, or primitive (Africans).\textsuperscript{19} This hierarchy was relatively widely accepted in the Ottoman world, although many Ottoman and Arab intellectuals employed Herbert Spencer’s Darwinian philosophy of the differentiation of species to dispute the permanency of the present rankings and argued that their current subordinate status was not only alterable, but possibly completely reversible as well.\textsuperscript{20} In any case, Le Bon’s theoretical framework goes far in explaining why the Japanese were an attractive symbol within the prevailing \textit{Zeitgeist} of the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century:

Character is formed by the combination (…) of the different elements (…) by the name of sentiments. Among the sentiments playing the most important part, perseverance, energy, and the power of self-control, as faculties more or less dependent on the will, must more especially be noted. We would also mention morality among fundamental elements of character...by morality we mean hereditary respect for the rules on which the existence of a society is based (…) the greatness of peoples depends in large measure on the level

\textsuperscript{17} See Gershoni and Jankowski, \textit{Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs}, 101-102, and Vatikiotis, \textit{Modern Egypt}, 184 on Egyptian journalists’ introduction of these ideas through the press.
\textsuperscript{20} Worringer, “‘Sick Man of Europe or Japan of the Near East’,” 207-230.
of their morality (...). The character of a people (...) determines its historical evolution, and governs its destiny.\(^{21}\)

For Eastern peoples, Japan represented the highest state of moral evolution possible, according to a set of standards defining national behavior that were predicated upon Western intellectual thought. The Japanese, in the eyes of Asian (and non-Asian) onlookers, had seemingly preserved their samurai ethical code, the Bushidō, and their Shintō ancestral rites, transforming these into a contemporary national morality that successfully guided Japan in all its endeavors. They were believed to have retained their cultural essence as they joined the ranks of the European powers.\(^{22}\)

Additionally, the Russo-Japanese War and Japan’s defeat of Czarist Russia in 1905 had an immense impact on the entire world, whether among the colonized nations of Africa and Asia who now felt their liberation was at hand,\(^{23}\) or among those Western imperial powers who anticipated that the emerging Japanese Empire was a ‘Yellow Peril’ that would soon rival and perhaps even threaten their own colonial and economic might in the Orient.\(^{24}\) The impact of Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 was threefold: most importantly for colonized peoples, as a challenge to the accepted schemes of racial hierarchy that predominated in the world at this time, Japan had overturned the assumption that Indo-European races were superior to the “average races” of the East. Some Asians argued their Eastern morality had actually raised the Japanese above the West and had

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initiated the process of reversing the civilizational hierarchy.\textsuperscript{25} Second, Japan’s war victory was symbolic of the power of independent nation-states over antiquated, multi-ethnic, multi-religious empires (the Russian and Ottoman). Finally, the results of the war reinforced the ideological lessons of the French Revolution for non-European elites: Russia’s loss and subsequent spiral into revolution in 1905 represented the defeat of autocracy by constitutionalism and parliamentary government, the twin pillars of prosperity. In a speech in Alexandria, the ardent Egyptian nationalist Mustafa Kāmil enthusiastically characterized Japan’s battle with Russia as that of truth, justice, progress, and patriotism against absolutism and injustice, as well as a lesson for the East in perseverance, action, and unity.\textsuperscript{26} Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, and Persians were all said to have been inspired to demand constitutionalism. An article of his also claimed Japan was now actively calling on the Afghans and the Ottomans to institute constitutional regimes.\textsuperscript{27} Meiji Japan, it appeared, had revived the East and proven its potential; soon it would be Egypt’s turn at revival.

Japan’s self-image was transposed after the renegotiation of the Unequal Treaties with Western Powers in 1894 and Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. The threat of Western occupation and colonization had plagued the Japanese for decades after Commodore Perry first forcibly opened the country in the 1850s. But by the late 1890s, Meiji officials were exuding an attitude of Great Power confidence and imperial entitlement commensurate with a nation that was now “leaving Asia” to “enter Europe,” in the famous locution of Japanese intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi.\textsuperscript{28} Japan had remained independent, promulgated a constitution, and rapidly modernized the country. Its military, retrained and retooled, proved itself a worthy opponent against much larger foes, allowing Japan to acquire its own colonial possessions (Liaotung Peninsula and Formosa

\textsuperscript{25} See “Me’yus Olmalı Miylz[?],” Şura-yı Ümmet 62(24 October 1904), 1, quoted in M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford University Press, 1995), 210; Ahmed Rıza, “La leçon d’une guerre,” Mechevret Supplément Français 169(1 November 1905), 2.

\textsuperscript{26} Mustafa Kāmil speech at the Zizenia Theater on 8 June 1904. In Awrāq Mustafa Kāmil: al-Khutub (Cairo, 1982), 267.

\textsuperscript{27} “New Life: In the East and the Constitution” in Mustafa Kāmil’s Arabic pan-Islamist al-‘Alam al-Islami (21 September 1906), 1. Translated from the Russian Novya Vremya.

\textsuperscript{28} Fukuzawa Yukichi editorial, “Datsu-a-ron” [Escape from Asia], Jiji Shinpo (March 1885).
[Taiwan] from China, 1895). With these achievements, the Meiji ruling oligarchy increasingly began to situate Japan at the apex of non-Western peoples, and to actively promote its stature in the world. Meiji Japan assumed the mantle of a superior whose “benevolent” civilizing mission in the East consisted of both delivering modernity to the less advanced races, and rescuing Asians from colonization by direct military challenges to the imperialist West. Success against Russia in 1905 confirmed to Japan and others its abilities in the latter regard, and set the global stage for a later confrontation with the West in the Pacific War of the mid-20th century. With Japan’s annexation of the Korean Peninsula in 1910, Koreans appeared quite alone in the world in their national resistance to what many Western and non-Western observers alike understood to be Japan’s active participation in the protection and modernization of a backward Asian country.

The Russo-Japanese War and Occupied Egypt

Egyptian elites and non-elites were captivated by Meiji Japan in the first decade of the 20th century despite Japan’s newfound official accord with Egypt’s British occupiers in 1902. Mustafa Kāmil, the editor of the Watanī Party mouthpiece, the prominent newspaper al-Liwā’, once wrote to a friend in Paris that it was not this alliance but the Entente Cordiale of 1904 between France and Britain that had sealed Egyptians’ fate as a colonized nation. When the Russo-Japanese war broke out in 1904, the Egyptian cabinet in Cairo publicized their official policy on warring parties in their waters in al-Waqā’i’a al-Misriyya, the Egyptian state newspaper. The

29 Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993) analyzes Japanese redefinition of themselves vis-à-vis China. Continental China, Chugoku, was refigured in the modern era as an inferior country Japan now called Shina.

30 The Japanese self-view as protectors of East Asia was often published in the Arabic press. In “Ra’is Wuzarā’ al-Yābān,” al-Liwā’ (14 July 1904), 1, Count Katsura explained Japan was not a war-monger; this was not a war of religion or domination, but a conflict between political states.

31 “Misr wa Kūriyā,” Misr al-Fatāt (21 August 1910), 1 describes annexation apologetically: Koreans did not care enough about their country, so Japan took matters into its own hands.

32 Letter to Juliette Adam, dated 9 June 1905. Mustafa Kāmil wrote that “it is not the Anglo-Japanese Alliance that put an end to my country’s independence, but rather the accord between treacherous England and France.” In Awrāq Mustafa Kāmil: al-Murāṣalāt (Cairo, 1982), 224.
declaration, encouraged by the British authorities, was meant to abide by international law and to emphasize Khedival Egyptian neutrality during the conflict at the same time that it subtly restricted the Russian fleet’s movements through the Suez Canal on its way to confront the Japanese further east. This position would significantly impact the outcome of the war in Japan’s favor.

In contrast to the discretion exhibited by the Egyptian administration, however, the general Egyptian population and the nationalist press were overtly jubilant at the prospect of a Japanese victory over the Czar’s forces, what it implied for the Ottoman Empire, for the downtrodden and colonized peoples of the East, and particularly for Egypt. For the average Egyptian, the Japanese victory was a newsworthy event that came up in daily conversation among the locals in Cairo. Schoolchildren memorized and recited aloud odes written by Egypt’s most famous poet of the day, Hāfiz Ibrahim, who eulogized the Japanese in works such as “Ghādat al-Yābān” [The Japanese Maiden], in which a Japanese woman is so dedicated to her nation that she decides to go to the war front to battle Russians herself, or “al-Harb al-Rūsīyya al-Yābānīyya” [The Russo-Japanese War].

33 British policy during this conflict was to remain neutral unless another power joined Japan’s enemy, as was stipulated in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. See Philip Towlle, “British Assistance to the Japanese Navy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5,” The Great Circle, 2:1(April 1980), 44-54.

34 Japanese ships had no reason to pass through the Mediterranean and Suez Canal during the conflict and thus remained unaffected. See original Egyptian cabinet memos in Arabic and French: Majlis al-Wuzarā’, Nizārat al-Khārijīya: Maḥfazah 5, Mutafarriqa Khāsā bi’l-Khārijīya, Majmu’a 15 Khārijīya, March 1904, Documents 6/1-6/6, “Bi Sha’n Mu’amālāt al-Sufun al-Harbīyya al-Rūsīyya wa’l-Yābānīyya fi’l-Miyāḥ al-Bahriyya al-Misriyya” (National Egyptian Archives, Cairo). Public announcement in “al-Qism al-Rasmī, Nizārat al-Khārijīyya: Iqrār min Qomandān al-Safīnah al-Harbīyya Subsequent to a Request by One of the Two Warring States concerning Egyptian Harbors,” al-Waqā’i’ā al-Misrīyya (10 February 1904), (12 February 1904). According to documents 6/3 and 6/4, another decision was published in the 2 March 1904 issue of al-Waqā’i’ā al-Misrīyya, but I was unable to confirm whether it differs from the earlier one. See also the Ottoman Archives, BBA YA.HUS 467/96, 27 February 1904. The Egyptian cabinet and the High Commissioner Ahmed Muhtar Pasha made clear they would defer any changes in policy to the Ottoman center.

War], both of which were initially published in the local newspapers and literary journals. The Egyptian press stimulated mass enthusiasm for Japan with their regular reportage of the Russo-Japanese war and their nationalist interpretations of events, which became the frequent topic of discussion and story-telling at the local coffeehouses and reading salons. The British occupation coupled with the foundations of Japanese independence and patriotism generated anti-imperialist, pan-Asian political consciousness among Egyptians everywhere who anticipated their own national “renewal”.

Mustafa Kāmil was the most vocal of Egyptian nationalist activists who used Japan continually in his rhetoric to express opposition to British rule. One historian credits him with restoring to Egyptians their self-confidence after the failed ‘Urabi revolt and the occupation, as well as with introducing the religious element of pan-Islamism into Egyptian patriotism. His Watanī Party, over which he presided until his unexpected death in 1908, officially demanded from the British government a constitution, parliament, and a compulsory education system. From 1903 onwards front-page articles in his al-Liwā’ and in other Egyptian papers (including Shaykh Ali Yusuf’s Islamist al-Mu’ayyad, the most widely read Cairene paper at the turn of the century), frequently emphasized Japan’s conflict with Russia in the Far East as part of the larger civilizational struggle between East and West, the outcomes of which determined Eastern nations’ status as independent countries or as European colonies. In 1904 he published a book on modern Japan called Bilād al-Shams al-Mushriqa [The Rising Sun]


37 In Yuwāqīm Rizq Murqus’ Sihāfat al-Hizb al-Watanī, 1907-1912 (Cairo, 1985), 80, he refers to the Arabic daily newspaper, Diya’ al-Sharq, as describing the Egyptian preoccupation with colonialism and with Japan as inspiring Egypt’s awakening.


that also appeared in a serialized version in al-Liwa‘.\textsuperscript{41} For Kāmil and other journalists, Russia was the aggressor in East Asia and on the Ottoman frontier. Japan represented the ability of the East to withstand the European colonial onslaught, to confront the West, to triumph over imperialism, and to adhere to international law.\textsuperscript{42}

Egyptians were compelled to identify with a larger Eastern world. Mustafa Kāmil’s newspaper rallied to the cry of “Asia for the Asians.”\textsuperscript{43} The British, he wrote, obviously encouraged Egyptians to support a British ally. Egyptians were obliged to show solidarity with Japan despite this alliance because “a victory for Japan is a victory for the Yellow Race,” which included not only seventy million Chinese Muslims, but eventually (in pan-Islamic, pan-Asian terms), the Muslims of India, Turkistan, Afghanistan, and Persia, all of whom would embark on a path toward modern civilization that could soon challenge Western hegemony.\textsuperscript{44} Overcoming ignorance and oppression in its own lands, the Japanese were now capable of effecting this worldwide by reversing the attacks of the ‘White Race’ upon Asians in what Kāmil called a “revolution” based upon the “solidarity of the Yellow Race”; he naively claimed Japanese objectives in Korea and China were to generate such cohesiveness.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{41} Bilād al-Shams al-Mushriqa (Cairo: al-Liwā‘, 1904). Laffan’s “Mustafa and the Mikado” cited earlier explores Kāmil’s monograph in more detail.


\textsuperscript{43} “Asyā lil-Asyawīyyīn,” al-Liwā‘ (17 September 1905), 1.

\textsuperscript{44} In “al-Harb al-Hādirah wa'l-Islām,” al-Liwā‘ (18 February 1904), 1 and “Misr wa'l-Islām wa'l-Yābān,” al-Liwā‘ (6 November 1904), 1, Kāmil wrote that the Far East war would take on a new role in determining the course of events in the Near East, affecting the lives of Muslims everywhere. According to “Min Jáwā ila al-Liwā‘,” al-Liwā‘ (2 June 1904), 1, Javanese Muslims were inspired by Japan’s victory to rise up against their Dutch colonial overlords.

\textsuperscript{45} Mustafa Kāmil, “al-Harb,” al-Liwā‘ (7 January 1904), 1. At a British society clubhouse, Baron Suimatsu and Marquis Itō explained Japanese and Chinese interests were one in the same. See “al-Muhālafa al-Inkilīzīyya al-Yābānīyya,” al-Liwā‘ (8 March 1904), 1.
Kāmil did not explicitly include Middle Easterners in this racial category, he noted that “we are naturally inclined to [support] Japan’s victory in this war” because “this youthful, vibrant country’s soldiers fight out of love of homeland,” and because the conflict would distract Russia from making war on the Ottoman Empire, thus providing the Turks an opportunity to build up resistance against future European imperialist activities.\(^\text{46}\)

To circumvent the issue of Japan being a pagan, non-Muslim nation, the rumor was persistently spread in news editorials composed by Kāmil as well as other journalists in Egypt and elsewhere that the Japanese Emperor and his people were on the verge of converting to Islam at any moment, merging pan-Islamism and pan-Asianism into an ultimate fantasy of the return to Eastern global pre-eminence led by a Muslim Meiji Japan (The Tatar Muslim exile and political activist from Russia, Abdürreşid İbrahim, had much involvement in propagating such rumors). Authors emphasized the congruity between Japanese cultural traits and Islam in an effort to make Japanese conversion plausible, and a Conference of Religions convened in Tokyo in 1906 spurred on the belief that Japan was seeking out a new religion that suited its special character.\(^\text{47}\) Such speculation emanated mostly from Cairo.\(^\text{48}\)

**The Nation: Egyptian Identity, Japanese Uniqueness**

How did Egyptians deploy the Japanese example to argue specifically for establishing a sovereign Egypt? Egyptian nationalist writers were generally mesmerized by Japan’s indigenous “national spirit” – supposedly the secret of Japan’s success – the ability of the Japanese to convert native energies into the trappings of a Western-style nation-state. Japanese strength of character, their “resolute determination and zeal,”\(^\text{49}\) their patriotic dedication and self-sacrifice for the sake of the nation’s welfare, were


\(^{47}\) If Japan became Muslim, the author of “al-Islām wa'l-Yābān,” *al-'Alam al-Islāmī* (6 July 1906), 2 explained, it would erode barriers between Arabs, Turks, Persians, and Indians.

\(^{48}\) This line of discussion was relatively absent from the Ottoman Arab press: Sultan Abdülhamid II’s regime censored speculation about Japanese conversion based on his private concern that the Japanese Emperor might become a more effective Caliph. The rumor also floated around Bukhara; see Siamak Adhami, “The Conversion of the Japanese Emperor to Islam; a Study of Central Asian Eschatology,” *Central Asiatic Journal* 43(1999), 1-9.

believed to have changed European policy toward the Far East and were
behind the establishment of Japan’s modern institutions. A combination
of knowledge and invention with ancestral reverence, loyalty to the Em-
peror as the personification of the homeland, and samurai morality mo-
tivated Japanese soldiers to fight using the most modern military equip-
ment and techniques, and to die honorably and bravely for their country
in the war against Russia. Japan was Asia’s teacher both in the tangible
skills of successful military technology, commerce and agriculture, and in
the abstract lessons of proper education and patriotism.

The two ethical foundations of the modern nation-state that made mil-
itary victories possible in the first place were that of unity of the nation’s
will, and the duty to pursue scientific knowledge for the public good. The
call for unity on a par with the Japanese example was reiterated in Cairo,
where the rift between Muslims and Copts was of concern to national-
ists defining the Egyptian nation in the pages of the press. The Coptic
Christians in Egypt, anxious about their integration into a future Egyp-
tian nation-state, tried to connect themselves to the larger Muslim pop-
ulation through a shared sense of Eastern and Egyptian national culture
and an overarching unity that disregarded religious differences. Al-Liwā’
cleverly weighed Japanese homogeneity against the Ottoman Empire’s
problematic multiplicity of ethnicities, religions, and languages, rather
than highlighting divisions within Egyptian society so clearly. Pointing
to Japanese unity with one another and with the Emperor as a source of

50 Kāmil, al-Shams al-Mushriqa, 117.
51 Mustafa Kāmil, “Ay al-Nasrayn Akbar?” al-Liwā’ (7 September 1905), 1, “SIRR Taqaddum al-Yā-
bān,” al-Liwā’ (3 August 1905), 1, “Batīl min Abtāl al-Yābān,” al-Liwā’ (26 June 1904), 1, Ahmad
Hilmī, “al-Jihād fī Sabīl al-Watan,” al-Liwā’ (17 November 1903), 1, “al-Watanīyya wa-
īl-Harb,” al-Liwā’ (15 March 1904), 1, “al-Watanīyya al-Yābānīyya,” al-Liwā’ (11 June 1904), 1, “Watanīy-
ya Nādira,” al-Liwā’ (11 August 1904), 1, “al-Hayā al-Qawmīyya fī al-Yābān,” al-Liwā’ (14 Sep-
tember 1905), 2.
52 “Luhmah bayna al-Sharqīyyīn,” al-Liwā’ (11 October 1904), 1. The author hoped Japan’s prog-
ress would reach the Near East and that an amicable relationship would ensue among
the Japanese Emperor, the Ottoman Sultan, and all peoples of Asia. See “al-Qūwwa al-Bahrīyya
al-‘Uthmānīyya,” al-Liwā’ (18 April 1904), 1 and “al-Bahrīyya al-‘Uthmānīyya,” al-Liwā’ (22
November 1904), 1 on Japan’s highly trained, technologically proficient naval and land forces.
53 From “Ibrat al-Sharq min al-Sharq: Mathal min al-Yābān,” in Coptic Christian Tadros Bey
al-Mangabadi’s newspaper Misr 12: 3417 (28 June 1907), 1.
54 “al-Yābānīyyūn wa-l-Atrāk,” al-Liwā’ (8 October 1904), 1; “Jawla fi’l-Islāh,” al-Liwā’ (22 October
1904), 1.
strength for the nation, Mustafa Kāmil appealed to “Ottoman Christians” to unite under the Ottoman standard as a patriotic act to reclaim the Empire’s former grandeur.\footnote{See “al-Islāḥ Hunna wa Hunnaka,” al-Liwā’ (20 December 1904), 1 and “al-Dawla al-‘Uliyya wa’l-Yābān,” al-Liwā’ (25 December 1904), 1.} The Ottoman Empire’s problems were twofold: first, Ottoman heterogeneity caused religious sectarianism that Japan did not experience, wrote Kāmil; second, Japanese unity was oriented around the throne of the Mikadō in an exchange of trust with the nation. The Emperor possessed a love for Japan and enlightenment; he did not act in his own self-interest, nor for foreign states, so that the people dedicated themselves to his service.\footnote{In return, this enlightened monarch initiated the scientific and literary awakening in Japan. See Ş., “al-Thawra al-Yābānīyya” (Part IV), in al-Balāgh al-Misri (La dépêche Egyptienne) 1:101(18 October 1910), 1.} Just as the Japanese fulfilled their patriotic duty to the homeland through progress, victory in war, and unity centered around the Emperor, the Egyptian nation, Muslim and Copt, would begin theirs by a united, unwavering struggle against the British, because this self-help, “...to do what Japan did, relying upon its own energy, demanding life and dominion from its efforts.....,” was incumbent upon Egyptian compatriots if they were ever to gain independence.\footnote{Mustafa Kāmil, speech entitled “Raghā’ib al-Hizb al-Watanī” given in Alexandria on 22 October 1907. From Awrāq Mustafa Kāmil: al-Khutub (Cairo, 1982), 28. Kāmil wrote to Juliette Adam that “...I am infatuated with patriots and I find in this [Japanese] nation the most beautiful example of patriotism!! How could I not like the Japanese people, as it is this unequaled Eastern race who presses Europe at its borders” (letter dated 9 June 1905, in Awrāq...Murāsalāt, 224.).} Mustafa Kāmil was fond of making vivid comparisons between Egypt and Japan in support of the premise that Egyptians were ready for modernity and that a British withdrawal must ensue in order to realize that aspiration. Kāmil was inspired as much by the resplendence of ancient Egypt and former Ottoman glories as he was by Ottoman governor Mehmet Ali’s dramatic modernization of the country. In a speech made in 1902 on the occasion of commemorating the former Khedive’s birthday, Kāmil reminded his audience that the Japanese were still in the shadows of Tokugawan isolationism when Mehmet Ali was challenging the West in a naval confrontation at Navarino Bay (in 1827, during the Greek rebellion), and claimed that Japan had actually looked to Egypt as a model for reform
soon after the Meiji Restoration.\textsuperscript{58} Indeed members of the 1873 Japanese Iwakura Mission that journeyed to Europe and the United States to “seek out knowledge from throughout the world”\textsuperscript{59} were dispatched to Cairo and Istanbul. The Japanese viewed the adoption of a Mixed Court system which dealt with juridical issues involving foreign nationals or consular officials like that in use in Egypt as an initial step toward revising the Unequal Treaties.\textsuperscript{60} Kāmil implored Egyptians in his speeches to regain their rightful place as a nation to lead the East, referring to Egypt’s former stature as a tutor to what was now the most advanced of the Eastern nations, Japan.\textsuperscript{61} In the preface of The Rising Sun, Kāmil compared Egyptians and Japanese, from whom Egyptians must learn or else continue to suffer under the colonial yoke. He extolled Japanese traits of noble-minded energy and self-confidence, courage, perseverance, self-sacrifice and self-dignity, virtues that foreign domination and tyrannical leadership had suppressed in Egypt. Thus Japanese students were industrious while Egyptians were lazy and indolent; comparing Japan to Egypt was in his words a comparison of England’s ally to the “prey between its teeth (...) the advanced to the backward; the ruling and the ruled; the hunter and the hunted (...) the rising sun and the sun which has set!”\textsuperscript{62}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{58} Speech delivered 21 May 1902. Kāmil asked rhetorically (regarding Navarino) “Where was Japan? Where was this active country and grand state? It was - and it was as if it did not exist - in the throes of oppression and the darkness of ignorance.” From Awrāq Mustaфа Kāmil: al-Khutub (Cairo, 1982), 247. The Tokugawa Shogunate sent its first students overseas circa 1862. Just as Britain had tried to rid itself of Mehmet Ali, Kāmil exhorted (245), Britain left Japan’s ports “surprised by its dazzling glory, victorious determination, true patriotism and defined zeal.” Ahmad Hilmi emphasized Mehmet Ali’s progressive vision as “that rare example of Egyptian cleverness” that was said to have surpassed even Japan. See “al-Jihād fi Sabil al-Watan,” al-Liwā’ (17 November 1903), 1. ‘Abd al-Qādir Hamza reminisced to this effect in 1910 [“Ina fi dhalika li-Ibra: Misr wa al-Yābān,” al-Garīda (28 August 1910), 1]: “Japan was nothing when Egypt was the only Eastern nation with zeal and perseverance.” Egypt, he argued, collapsed after allowing foreigners to prevail first over government, then over Egyptians’ souls with their Western knowledge and money, whereas Japan’s students borrowed only what was necessary from Europe and returned home to deliver this knowledge to their countrymen.


\textsuperscript{61} Awrāq Mustaфа Kāmil: al-Khutub (Cairo, 1982), 267.

\textsuperscript{62} Kāmil, al-Shams al-Mushriqa, 8-9 [in al-Liwā’ (19 June 1904), 1-2]. See also Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, 109-110.}
Kāmil rarely let an opportunity pass to demand non-cooperation with the British administration and solidarity with the Ottoman state as the first step toward Egyptian self-determination. By contrast, al-Sayyid’s rival political organization, the Umma Party, supported a level of accommodation with the British authorities in order to facilitate secular, constitutional Egyptian statehood, the ideological foundation for the later Egyptian Wafdist Party of the 1920s. But whereas Kāmil’s Watanī Party had contrived an amorphous anti-colonial conception of the Egyptian nation, the ideas disseminated by the Umma Party reflected a more specific nation-state orientation. Authors were no less persistent in using images of Japan, the nation that had “awakened from its ancient slumber,” in the pages of their *al-Garīda* newspaper. Its contributors understood Japanese patriotism as an expression of the unified national will to absorb and adopt science. Pondering why it was that “when Japan adopts Western civilization it progresses; Egypt tries and falls apart,” the Umma Party linked the true patriotism of the Japanese and their love of homeland to the transformation of science into action. Like Kāmil, they understood Japanese patriotism as a consequence of the people’s relationship to the governing house of the imperial family: devotion to the Emperor generated national unity and subordinated personal interest to the welfare of the nation as a natural duty, allowing Japan to prevail over foreign enemies. Japanese integrity, moderation, and good conduct tempered with a reverence for ancestors stimulated the acquisition of science and technology among all members of society because “a nation is only that because of science,” otherwise its destiny is ignorance and colonization.

According to *al-Garīda*, the pursuit of universal science combined the “spirit of Japan” with the “knowledge of the West” in an assimilative process whereby Japan merely adopted what suited them from European countries and then adapted these attributes to their own deeply-rooted, indigenous civilization. Assimilation and eugenics – that is, carefully

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64 “Intiqād wa Iqtirāh,” *al-Garida* 1:5(13 March 1907), 1.
combining Egyptian cultural character with modern Western learning as Japan had done – was a national responsibility that would lead to a higher level of civilization in Egypt. Japan had accomplished in forty years what it took Europe four centuries to achieve, not by blind imitation of Western culture and civilization, but by a thorough understanding of reform and modern progress. Consequently, Japan now represented morally, culturally, and technologically, a nation superior in the East and in the world. Egypt should follow Japan’s lead in borrowing the proper knowledge from the West because Egypt was geographically close enough to Europe and its native identity had been solidly established. In this discourse, local Egyptian consciousness had become synonymous with Japanese ancestral heritage, as two corresponding foundations for national identity, each of which reinforced the ability of the collective soul to achieve its potential. In other words, Egypt could prove its capabilities once again by following in the footsteps of the Japanese and harnessing the inherent Egyptian spirit.

Egypt the State: Japanese Education, Elites, and Institutions

Egyptian nationalist writers identified several fundamental tools of nation-state necessary for Egypt to reach modernity: an elite class of intellectuals and officials, a progressive, compulsory education system, and representative, constitutional government. Japan had cultivated the former to develop and institutionalize the latter. These “tools” were interdependent upon one another: for Egyptians adhering to Samuel Smiles’ philosophy, the nation was equal to the aggregate character of its men; the new elite coming out of a reformed educational system, Le Bon’s “true incarnation of the race,” would guide the nation toward progress, and initiate and

Tōkio: Tarikat Ta’ālim al-‘Amm” (Part II), al-Garīda 1:276(5 February 1908), 1.
68 “Mā Na’khudhuhu min Êrûbā wa mā Yana’u Misr,” al-Garīda 4:?(1 March 1910), 1. Assimilation was exhibited in the way Japanese wore Western clothing outside the home but maintained traditional fashions at home, “in the spirit of patriotism” [“Hadīth ‘an al-Sharq al-Aqsā,” al-Mu‘ayyad (23 February 1904), 1]. See also “al-Dawla al-Sharqīyya al-Jadīda,” al-Mu‘ayyad (27 March 1904), 1.
69 “Al-Islāh Hunna wa Hunnaka,” al-Liwā’ (20 December 1904), 1. The author of “al-Sharq wa’l-Gharb,” al-Garīda 1:4(12 March 1907), 1 declared that Japanese assimilation disproved the maxim of “East is East, West is West, and never the ‘twain shall meet.”
70 See “Damīr al-Muwazzaf,” al-Garīda (23 February 1911), 1 on Japanese officials’ integrity.
manage the constitutional, parliamentary processes that guaranteed the social order and national interest. Reform had to be implemented from above, to shape and direct peasant energies. Meiji Japan showed what was possible when competent, educated people ran the government and made the correct decisions, epitomizing the relationships between individuals’ active, disciplined mentalities and the nation’s strength and progress. The greatest dangers to a polity, it was argued, were a disloyal, traitorous official or a biased administration which leads the country down a false path toward modernity.

Education organized and renewed the mind of the citizen just as the countryside was being technologically modernized because the moral order was no less important than the material order. Sending missions to Europe to study government organization and scientific advances every year had led to a reformed education system in Japan that turned out great statesmen who, after casting aside impractical ancient traditions and embracing knowledge of the West, comprehended modernization strategies as much as they understood the needs of the people. In his famous 1899 treatise on the liberation of women, Qāsim Amīn concurred. Egyptian nationalists perceived Japan’s universal education system as the key to its strength because it inculcated powerful national morals resulting in a religious sense of unity of purpose to sacrifice for the nation. The Japanese Imperial Rescript on Education was propagated in all secondary schools and public events as the ethical premise defining patriotic subjects’ unity.

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71 Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, 122, explains that this model of progress - disciplining society through education - centralized power among elites, thus inevitably increasing social inequality.

72 Kāmil, al-Shams al-Mushriqa, 62. Also “al-Nahda al-Sharqiyya,” al-Liwa’ (16 October 1904), 1. Japan was still Confucian in its understanding of state functions and societal obligations.

73 “al-Islāh Hunna wa Hunnaka,” al-Liwa’ (20 December 1904), 1.

74 Durkheim’s lectures on regenerating collective morality through education, Smiles’ Self-Help, with Illusions of Character, Conduct and Perseverance (trans. by Yaqūb Sarrūf), and Le Bon’s Psychologie des Foules (trans. by Fathi Zaghlūl) contributed to these views (Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, 108-110, 121-122). Prime Minister of Egypt Nūbār Pasha viewed modernity within moral and material parameters; he desired a guarantee of the moral order through modern European law consolidating private property (Mitchell, 100).


76 See Qāsim Amin, Tahrīr al-Mar’a (Cairo: 1970), 183. English translation in Worringer, Ottomans Imagining Japan..., 228.

77 “al-Ma’arif fi al-Yābān,” al-Liwa’ (10 August 1905), 1; “Tarbiyya qabla al-’Ilm,” al-Liwa’ (25 September 1905), 1. The Japanese were said to have achieved a 72% literacy rate.
with their forefathers and their responsibility to serve homeland and ancestors courageously. The Japanese Ministry of Public Instruction reportedly reintroduced the teaching of moral, Confucian values and ancestral reverence (including devotion to the Emperor) after these principles had been prohibited previously; ethical upbringing had recreated a new spirit in Japan, in the mold of the old, yet modernized for today’s nation-state. The government, in turn, was determined to carry out the education of its people by founding scientific, industrial, and agricultural educational facilities, even though Japanese people’s natural intelligence already inclined them towards commerce and agriculture. The outward signs of progress in Japan were the increased number of colleges, a flourishing press, and technological advances like railroads and electricity in the countryside. Loyal devotion to ancestors also created a foundation for Japan’s modern political authority: it perpetuated the ancient throne; citizens behaved with integrity toward one another while striving for perfection in all scientific endeavors; they respected the constitution and obeyed the law.

Kāmil reminded readers in The Rising Sun that the Japanese had long been concerned with the upbringing of their citizenry and that Japan was experienced in the art of assimilation – it had done so with Chinese learning in earlier centuries. Education in Japan improved upon the moral character and assisted the state in assimilating Western sciences, in implementing constitutional government, and in guaranteeing freedom, equality, and the nation’s sovereignty. Unlike Japan, argued al-Garīda, Egypt did not possess a patriotic, compulsory education system that was unified in purpose at the elementary, secondary, and higher levels; its schools did not aim to cultivate an interest in arts and sciences as a way for students to serve sovereign and nation. Egyptians merely learned the general sciences in foreign schools without the proper sense of patriotism to guide

81 “al-Irtiqā’ al-Sahīh: Dars”
82 Kāmil, al-Shams al-Mushriqa, 117.
83 al-Bustāni, “Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tōkīo: Tarīqat al-Ta’ālīm al-‘Amm” (Part II), 1.
their use of this knowledge. All Egyptians had to benefit where they could from European teachers: as members of a larger national body, each was to do his or her duty to help that body develop and grow through the active pursuit of education.\textsuperscript{84} The most modern training was to be extended to women as well, as a contributing sector of the population.\textsuperscript{85} The discipline derived from education prepared Egyptians to perform their civil functions with speed and precision; this was the difference between European progress and Egyptian backwardness.\textsuperscript{86} The lack of national schools in Egypt (compared to the large number of Japanese educational institutions) directly corresponded to Egypt’s impotence in trying to bring about a British evacuation.\textsuperscript{87}

Egyptian nationalists demanded the reestablishment of a full constitutional system in Egypt.\textsuperscript{88} They deployed the Japanese example, a constitutional power since 1889, to inveigh against the British, whom they argued, had derailed the political process.\textsuperscript{89} Russia was defeated in 1905 in what \textit{al-Li\textasciiuml\textbackslash wa\textasciiuml\textbackslash i} called the “war of the constitution” because Japan was a free country where no one feared government oppression or tyranny at the hands of the Mikad\textasciiuml\textbackslash o.\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Al-Gar\textasciiuml\textbackslash da} referred to the 1905 Russian revolution as having been a result of Japan kindling the flames of constitutionalism; the

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\textsuperscript{84} \textit{al-Bust\textasciiuml\textbackslash an}, “\textit{Bayna al-Q\textasciiuml\textbackslash a\textasciiuml\textbackslash hira wa T\textasciiuml\textbackslash o\textasciiuml\textbackslash kio: Tariqat al-Ta\textasciiuml\textbackslash alim al-\textasciiuml\textbackslash 'Amm”} (Part II), 1.
\textsuperscript{85} See “\textit{Mahal al-Istiql\textasciiuml\textbackslash l\textasciiuml\textbackslash l},” \textit{al-Gar\textasciiuml\textbackslash da} 1:235 (15 December 1907), 1 on Japanese compulsory education extending to girls; “\textit{Li Hay\textasciiuml\textbackslash a\textasciiuml\textbackslash t al-A\textasciiuml\textbackslash ’il\textasciiuml\textbackslash iyya fi al-Y\textasciicircum\textasciiuml\textbackslash a\textasciiuml\textbackslash b\textasciiuml\textbackslash an},” \textit{al-Gar\textasciiuml\textbackslash da} 1:167 (23 September 1907), 1 on the Japanese woman as sanctuary for and guardian of Japanese morality, in her familial obligations as educator of the children and manager of the household.
\textsuperscript{86} View expounded by ‘\textit{Abd al-\textasciiuml\textbackslash 'Az\textasciiuml\textbackslash iz J\textasciiuml\textbackslash awish}, co-founder of the Watani Party and Inspector-General in the Ministry of Education, in a definition of \textit{tarb\textasciiuml\textbackslash iyya} from a 1903 government textbook on education. Husayn al-Mars\textasciiuml\textbackslash afi, a senior professor at a teacher training college, believed there were three institutions that would inculcate this new discipline in individuals: the school, the political assembly, and the press (Mitchell, 89–90).
\textsuperscript{87} “\textit{al-Ma\textasciiuml\textbackslash a\textasciiuml\textbackslash arif fi al-Y\textasciicircum\textasciiuml\textbackslash a\textasciiuml\textbackslash b\textasciiuml\textbackslash an},” \textit{al-Li\textasciiuml\textbackslash wa\textasciiuml\textbackslash i} (10 August 1905), p. 1 and “\textit{Li ‘Amim al-Ma\textasciiuml\textbackslash a\textasciiuml\textbackslash arif},” \textit{al-Li\textasciiuml\textbackslash wa\textasciiuml\textbackslash i} (3 May 1908), 1.
\textsuperscript{88} See “\textit{al-Watan\textasciiuml\textbackslash iyya wa al-Harb},” \textit{al-Li\textasciiuml\textbackslash wa\textasciiuml\textbackslash i} (15 March 1904), 1. Egypt’s brief encounter with parliamentarism commenced in 1866. Two decrees instituted a Chamber of Deputies; another decree in 1878 provided for a Cabinet. The Chamber was suspended in 1879, but in late 1881 it was resuscitated as an elected legislative body, the National Constituent Assembly, and a constitutional charter was proclaimed. See J.N.D. Anderson, “Law Reform in Egypt: 1850-1950,” in P.M. Holt (ed.), \textit{Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt} (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 212.
\textsuperscript{89} See for example “\textit{Dal\textasciiuml\textbackslash i\textasciiuml\textbackslash l al-Mu\textasciiuml\textbackslash a\textasciiuml\textbackslash ayad: Id\textasciiuml\textbackslash arat al-Y\textasciicircum\textasciiuml\textbackslash a\textasciiuml\textbackslash b\textasciiuml\textbackslash an},” \textit{al-Mu\textasciiuml\textbackslash a\textasciiuml\textbackslash ayad} (8 March 1904), 2.
\textsuperscript{90} “\textit{Harb al-Dust\textasciiuml\textbackslash ur},” \textit{al-Li\textasciiuml\textbackslash wa\textasciiuml\textbackslash i} (17 December 1904), 1.
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Japanese extended this social philosophy across Asia, to Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, Persians, Afghans and Ottomans (a constitutional revolution took place in Persia in 1906). There was hope that “Japan would spread the light of freedom to Egypt.”

The Meiji Emperor and his statesmen had seemingly modernized country and society through the processes of education and parliamentary administration. Kāmil propagated the notion that the Japanese political model was superior to any European one, for “the Mikadō did not violate the wishes of his people a single time; constitutional monarchs in Europe scarcely follow the will of the nation like this.” Egyptian newspapers *al-Sha‘b* and *al-Balāgh al-Misri* talked of Japanese political development as a cooperative effort between the people themselves who had restored the Emperor to his exalted position, and the just, enlightened Emperor, the Mikadō, who had benevolently granted the Japanese people a constitution and allowed them to participate in government through political parties and the electoral process. This system was based on the German model, the newspaper argued, and created a government that served the people’s needs. It was the only means to guarantee the eradication of oppression and the facilitation of progress.

*Al-Garīda* provided an in-depth analysis of the Japanese political system and what Egypt could learn from it in a series published in 1908 called “Between Cairo and Tokyo,” an elaborate schema that connected patriotism, the emergence of political parties, constitutional monarchy, and education together. The author claimed to possess the true secrets behind Japan’s dramatic success in the world: first and foremost, “the nation’s interest

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94 Kāmil, *al-Shams al-Mushriqa*, 127. Quoting the Mikadō’s first speech, Kāmil described the Japanese Emperor as encouraging his people to “abandon harmful delusions and customs,” and to “borrow new ideas from the entire world to increase the honor of the kingdom” (79-80).
above all others” dictated the actions of every individual and party; general education was geared toward obtaining this objective.\textsuperscript{97} When Japan’s political parties adopted ideas from European parties, they maintained the principle that individuals did not seek political power but served out of devotion to the Emperor. Political parties addressed vital issues and abstained from the personal goals of their leaders.\textsuperscript{98} Japan’s political parties debated the issues to determine the nation’s best interest and how to carry out procedures for this purpose, demonstrating a true understanding of constitutionalism; once decided, they acted in unison for the nation’s well-being. By contrast, Egypt’s political parties were still in a fledgling state, having been influenced by political domination, international treaties, and occupation that created a particular foreign policy not resembling that of a country in and of itself.\textsuperscript{99} Egyptian political parties were only concerned with special interests and not with the general welfare. As long as parties were unwilling to sacrifice their needs for those of the nation, the patrie would be endangered. For Egypt, support for the Khedival throne, recognition of Egypt’s sovereignty, preservation of current treaties, and administrative independence were of utmost importance.\textsuperscript{100}

Education was to provide Egyptians with the skills necessary to discern the most important concerns of the state, fashioning responsible officials from among the most capable citizens to carry out the task.\textsuperscript{101} In Japan the patriotic spirit of education was transferred to political party behavior; students in school first learned their rights and responsibilities and then exercised them through political parties and the parliamentary process. “Patriotic spirit” was “a natural result of the relationship between ruler and ruled in this country”: the nation felt the right and the political power granted by the Mikadô (without riot or war) because of the people’s love for the Emperor. All citizens felt in their souls that sovereignty lay with the Emperor, as the embodiment of defense of the nation and all that was possible for it to achieve militarily, economically, commercially,
agriculturally, and diplomatically. Education and political parties were merely outward manifestations of this sentiment. \[102\] Japanese political parties made service in the Emperor’s name their primary focus, and since the Japanese possessed a constitutional spirit, the Emperor was able to relinquish political power in favor of the exercise of rights of the nation. \[103\]

“What is constitutionalism except the nation enjoying its natural rights?” the author pondered before reminding his audience that there was “no political power without the nation; without the exercise of power and rights, there is no nation.” \[104\] Whoever demanded a constitution for the nation must teach its citizenry that this was the source of sovereignty. Egypt had not yet fully developed a constitutional spirit that permeated society, imparting a sense of the nation’s rights, and ultimately causing material growth and progress. \[105\]

Some Egyptian nationalists pointed out that constitutional law was necessary for the East if it wanted to eradicate European exploitation (such as the capitulatory privileges forced upon the Ottoman Empire). Japan, it was noted, had been able to rid itself of its unequal arrangements with European powers in the 1890s because there was no place for capitulations in a nation with European-style laws; Egyptian cabinet minister Nūbīr Pasha had attempted to follow Japan’s example with his reform platform in Egypt. \[106\] The Watanī Party paper *al-ʿAlam* also reminded readers that Japanese private property was now legally protected against foreign appropriation. \[107\] Japan’s “constitutional revolution” was reported as a blow to the absolutist government and a concerted effort on the part of Japanese citizens to overthrow a weak Shogunate that could not oust foreigners from its borders and preserve the integrity of the country. \[108\]

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102 From al-Bustāni, “Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tōkio: al-Rūh al-Dustūriyya Hunna wa Hunnaka” (Part III), *al-Garida* 1:278 (8 February 1908), 1, attributed originally to Alfred Stead.

103 The “spirit of constitutionalism” was defined by Yūsuf al-Bustāni, “Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tōkio: fi al-Qarya wa fi al-Sijn” (Part IV), *al-Garida* 1:285 (16 February 1908), 1 as “parties in parliament,” “teachers in schools,” and most importantly, the peasantry who left their land and families to fight wars for the homeland.


**Egyptian National Resistance: Anti-Colonialism and Modernity**

In an effort to articulate a viable form of Egyptian self-governance in the early decades of the 20th century, Egypt’s nationalists produced a discourse on Japanese nationhood while conveniently setting aside the imperialist implications of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Mustafa Kāmil and many of his associates vehemently opposed the British, and members of al-Sayyid’s Umma Party who contributed to al-Garīda were ambivalent toward the occupation and its consequences for Egypt. At the same time, these nationalists wrote enthusiastically of Japan achieving Great Power status as represented by the very treaty itself. Russia was seen as the imperial aggressor and Japan the defender of the colonized East in the Russo-Japanese War, despite this being a clash over colonial possessions in East Asia. Control of Manchuria and what was labeled the “guarantee of Korea’s independence” were not imperialist goals of the Japanese, argued the writers of Kāmil’s Watanī Party newspaper, but a means of protecting Japan’s sovereignty against foreign invasion and domination by Russia. Very few Egyptian voices dissented against the prevalent view of the Japanese as principled defenders of the East to point out Japan’s expansionist motives in Asia.

The Egyptian nationalist movement linked itself to the Japanese, the allies of their British occupiers, rather than to Korea, a fellow Eastern country colonized by Japan and annexed officially in 1910. Korea was seen by the nationalists as unable to modernize by itself and in need of Japanese “assistance” to drag it into modernity. Egyptian nationalists, many of whom were Western-educated and anti-colonialist, were receptive to the message of Japan and the potential power that emulating its pattern might generate for Egypt. Korea was a colonized loser and not worthy of much Egyptian attention or sympathy. Egyptian nationalist elites who envisioned an independent country with themselves at the helm identified


111 See Alexandrian Jew Yaʿqūb Sānūʿ (James Sanua)’s satirical paper Abū Nazzāra (Paris, 1878-1910); he notes the Russo-Japanese war was not fought in defense of the patrie.
very readily with the Japanese statesmen whom they idealized. This was at the expense of reality, for they typically ignored Japanese imperialism in Asia altogether or at least viewed Japan as conducting as a noble *mission civilisatrice* for Asia. In any case, Egyptian nationalists, seeing Egypt confidently, as ready for nationhood, would more closely identify with a fellow independent and empowered Eastern brother, Japan, than with Korea, an East Asian replica of Egypt’s weaker self. Nationalists, in Egypt and elsewhere, had to make ideological choices that were not always consistent with the realities in order to make the point.

The perception endured in the minds of prominent Egyptian nationalists that Japan was not a colonial power; rather, Japan was merely performing a noble task in delivering modernity to China or Korea by “re-forming” their indigenous Chinese or Korean traditions. It was still the assessment among many Egyptian nationalists as late as 1910, when it was argued for example that Meiji Japan was “a trusted ally of Korea,”112 or that Japan had influenced constitutional reforms in the Chinese government.113 On the rare occasion when the similarities between Egypt and Korea as fellow colonized peoples were noted in the press,114 this resemblance was overshadowed by an apologetic tone towards Japan’s imperialist actions because of its character as an awakened Eastern nation on a civilizing mission, followed immediately by more vitriolic condemnations of British and French policies in North Africa.115 After the 1910 Korean annexation, the Egyptian press continued to refer to modern Japan as a nation to emulate; Egyptian military personnel, journalists, and members of the Khedive’s family personally journeyed to East Asia to decipher the “Secret of Japan’s Progress” (the title of one of the subsequent monographs published).116

114 I found only two such references: “Inkiltāra wa Misr wa’l-Yābān wa Küriyā,” *al-Garīda* (27 August 1910), 1; “Li Hafz al-Nizām wa’l-Amn al-‘Amm,” *al-Garīda* (10 September 1910), 4.
115 “Li Hafz al-Nizām wa’l-Amn al-‘Amm,” 4.
116 Yüzbaşı Ahmad al-Fadli, *Kitāb Sirr Taqaddum al-Yābān* (Cairo: 1911). The brother of the Khedive, Prince Muhammad Ali went to Japan on several occasions and published his travel account, *al-Rihla al-Yābānīyya*, in 1912. Ali Ahmad al-Girgawī, owner and editor of the Egyptian newspaper *al-Irshād*, published his own *al-Rihla al-Yābānīyya* [*The Japanese Journey*] in Cairo in 1907/8 after a brief trip to Japan. Three Egyptian youths were reportedly sent to Japan to study
Were Egyptians unaware of, or did they conveniently ignore the fact that the Japanese, interested in finding utilitarian methods of managing their own colonial acquisitions in East Asia after 1905, actually looked to the British occupation in Egypt as a model for imperial administration of their own newly-acquired colonies? Japan had studied the British occupation of Egypt as a guide to administering Korea. The Japanese admired former British civil administrator of Egypt Lord Cromer (Sir Evelyn Baring); they had his 2-volume treatise, *Modern Egypt* (1908), translated into Japanese in 1911.\(^{117}\) Known for his rigid and absolutist administrative style during his years as governor-general of Egypt (from 1883 until 1907, when he was forced to resign over the Dinshaway affair), this manual was looked upon favorably by prominent Japanese officials such as Ōkuma Shibenobu as a useful guide for managing their Korean possession.\(^{118}\) The *Japan Weekly Mail* outlined Japanese views very clearly in 1907:

> The leading Japanese journals speak in enthusiastic terms of Lord Cromer and the great work he has done in Egypt. They recall the immense difficulties he had to encounter at the outset of his administration and the extraordinary perseverance and patience shown by him in never flinching or allowing himself to be discouraged by the attacks directed against him and his administration at the outset. It is easy to see that these papers have Marquis Itō in their thoughts when they write thus. They appreciate that his task in Korea closely resembles that which fell to Lord Cromer in Egypt.\(^{119}\)

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\(^{118}\) For Ōkuma’s comments, see *Saikin Ejiputo*, Volume 1, 12-13 in the Preface. I am indebted to Cemil Aydın for this Japanese reference.

\(^{119}\) *Japan Weekly Mail* (20 April 1907), 423. I am indebted to Michael Penn for this reference. Itō was Resident-General of Korea until his assassination in Harbin by a Korean anti-colonial rebel. See Hane, *Modern Japan*, 180.
The Egyptian press was in fact aware of Marquis Itō’s unflattering comparison when he publicly stated Japan’s intention “to strive to make Korea a second Egypt.”

In the early 20th century the Egyptian nationalist leadership repeatedly contended that Egypt must be allowed self-determination in order to reach its full potential as a fellow participant in the world of nation-states. They chose to identify themselves with an imperialist power, Meiji Japan, its institutions and behavior, over and above any connections to the peoples Japan had occupied, Egypt’s colonized ‘brothers’ in East Asia, the Koreans, the Taiwanese, or the Chinese. Egyptians identified with the victors, the Japanese ‘civilization-bearer’, rather than the colonized losers of East Asia, whose political circumstances more closely resembled those of Egypt under British authority. Not only did Egyptian anti-colonial ideology minimize the implications of Meiji Japan’s formal alliance with Britain. Egyptians downplayed or avoided altogether acknowledging Japanese actions in Asia as imperialist, in the name of embracing what were at the time considered to be the true principles of modernity and the only viable path to national liberation for Eastern peoples: the foundations of Western statehood, which Japan had successfully adopted and came to represent in the Orient. Japan’s achievements signified the innate potential within all Asians to become modern, overriding any desire to draw conclusions about Japanese colonialism.

Such anti-colonial nationalist movements among non-European peoples, a new feature of the world at the turn of the 20th century, tended to resemble one another. They espoused anti-colonial ideologies which placed Japan at the helm of ‘the East’ in an effort to realize self-determination. To Egyptian nationalists around the turn of the 20th century, Meiji Japan could only be a symbol of Oriental potential to achieve Western modernity, and not an imperialist. A brutal colonizer could only be Western, and not a fellow Easterner. Egypt’s nationalist assessments of modern Japan that ignored the less attractive aspects of Japanese policy in Asia make sense if we consider that the most recent Egyptian experience of colonialism (and indeed the typical experiences of many others as well at this time) was an entanglement with a European power, reinforcing the impression

120 “Misr wa Kūriyā,” Misr al-Fatāt, 1.
that colonial activities were always undertaken by the imperialist West. Like in Egypt, the Chinese *Ch’ing-i* [national renovation movement] in the last quarter of the 19th century that extended into the 1898 Chinese Reform Movement, and also Phan Bội Châu’s Vietnamese *Đông-du* [Go East] movement in the early 20th century, typified the tendency among elites of other non-Western societies seeking modernity to look selectively to Japan for guidance.\(^{121}\) The Indian nationalist struggle against the British Raj was one which idealized Meiji Japan, and to complement the intellectual discourse on Japan, Indian nationalists made direct contacts with the Japanese to assist in their demands for economic self-sufficiency and political self-governance.\(^{122}\) But proximity to and direct experience of the Japanese ascent to power determined the rate and intensity with which a colonized nation became disillusioned with the Japanese model, the Koreans and Chinese being the first to resist Japan as an occupying power. A distant Egypt, on the other hand, continued to imagine the ideal of modern Japan in any way its nationalists chose to portray it.

At this moment, Egyptian nationalists (and other non-Westerners) whose political or cultural affairs were administered by a colonial overlord, denying them a substantial voice in governing, often adhered to the hegemonic, West-centric understanding of modern progress circulating in the world. The relationship between colonialism and modernity in this context essentially precluded the articulation of a coherent, effective ideology of international solidarity and universal anti-colonial resistance among peoples similarly experiencing physical occupation by an imperial power. This follows because peoples not yet believed to have ‘become modern’ (i.e. Korea) were deemed by both Eastern and Western elites to be in need


\(^{122}\) See Dua’s discussion of Indian political exiles in Japan; the Indian Swadeshi boycott and Japanese goods flowing into India, and Japanese machines used in Indian textile factories.
of assistance according to standards dictated by the West. A ‘more advanced’ power’s colonial intrusion (i.e. Japan in Korea) was thus justifiable, up to the point at which the fledgling nation was ready for independence. In the case of Egypt, convinced of Egypt’s fulfillment of modern criteria, the nationalists engaged in anti-colonial resistance to eradicate the British presence from the Nile Valley in the early 20th century. Egyptian ideology centered fervently around contesting specifically British imperialism, rather than publicly objecting to all colonialist actions in the world without distinction; it did not extend to opposing Japanese imperial exploits.

The distillation of anti-colonial attitudes through the filter of West-centric, Japanese progress explains the lack of Egyptian solidarity with the Koreans’ plight just as it goes far in accounting for the high degree of Egyptian sympathy and support for the Indian nationalists against their British overlords or for the Javanese resistance against the Dutch. In those cases, not only could the pan-Asian, anti-colonial rhetoric incorporate a pan-Islamic tone, but the occupier was clearly European, an ontological opposite, a Western ‘Other’, behaving according to what were assumed to be its inherently negative and inhumane predispositions. The East, in contrast, was able to preserve its superior morality. Some historians view this pattern as a pan-Asian identity, or an Easternism, that is reactive in nature, a purely fictive modality generated as a response to the West:

The widest basis of an Eastern orientation in Egypt in the 1920s was an external and largely artificial one: the difference between all the lands and peoples of the East, on the one hand, and the well-defined, apparently homogenous, and then dominant West, on the other. Easternism in this sense was derivative, a function not of intrinsic similarities or bonds among the individual units constituting the East but rather of their all being something other than the West.

As a derivative anti-colonial discourse, and derivative in my view refers also to the way Partha Chatterjee understands it – that is, anti-Western discourse produced by the non-West but informed by European intellectual

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thought so that the West ultimately retained its position in setting the standards for measuring ‘true progress’ – perhaps the Egyptian idealization of Japan as a model nation-state representative of Eastern modernity could not help but be rife with contradictions. A universalist, “non-derivative” anti-colonial resistance not based purely upon pan-Asian or pan-Eastern identity but upon generic resistance to any imperialist action committed by another nation would take decades longer to develop.

The start of the First World War and the British declaration of Egypt’s status as a protectorate interrupted the nationalists’ focus for a time. In the aftermath of the war, those sympathetic to the Umma Party’s Western-oriented, secular ideas continued to pursue an accommodationist policy that involved forming a delegation, the Wafd, as a vehicle for officially representing and peacefully, legally achieving Egyptian national interests, the most crucial of which were to repeal Egypt’s status as a protectorate and to grant Egypt independence. In 1918 the Wafdists anticipated traveling to London to present their demands directly at the Paris Peace Conference. Britain refused to allow this, arrested prominent members of the delegation and exiled them to Malta, an action which was immediately followed by public demonstrations, violent riots, strikes, and further arrests in Egypt in 1919 that forced the British to acquiesce. The Wafdist exiles returned and traveled to Versailles, where the Japanese sat at the table as victors with their fellow Allied Powers. Attempts by Japan to insert a racial equality amendment into the League of Nations Covenant at the Paris Peace conference perpetuated Japan’s image as a crusader for non-European peoples (including African-American activists) as the Japanese strived to effect on paper a recognizable change in the racial hierarchy; they were unsuccessful in this endeavor. Japan’s motives pertained to erasing the final obstacle obfuscating its unconditional equality with Western powers in determining global affairs. Certainly, this had an impact upon the Egyptian Wafdists present, and Egyptians continued to regard Japan as an exemplary nation-state throughout the 1920s, during Egypt’s Easternism

movement. Japan mediated a Westernized modernization program with Eastern identity. When Egyptian nationalists needed to draw a distinction between Eastern capabilities and Western colonial dominance to plead their case for independence in the post-World War One era, Japan served as the definitive example of Asian possibility, without alienating Egyptians who despised reforms resembling Western imitation. Egypt could follow suit, reforming and modernizing education, government, industries, and the minds of its people in order to compete in the 20th century nation-state system.

The decoupling of colonialism and modernity from ‘the West’ occurred in the early to mid-20th century when Asians, Africans and Middle Easterners began to more substantially question Western strategies and goals for becoming a modern society, and their suitability altogether for ‘Eastern’ peoples. Although colonialism was still often assumed to be an aggression carried out by the West (i.e. Europe and America), recognition of the viability of alternative paths to modernity was fueled by rapid decolonization in many areas of the non-Western world. Finally made obsolete was the notion that the foundations of modernity were merely the preserve of the West. This was a realization shared by many anti-colonial nationalists that there could be more than one legitimate path to modernity, that in fact “modern progress” did not need to be understood as a possession of the West, and that it could more successfully be achieved by genuine reliance upon indigenous cultural foundations instead. Previous attempts by mainly Western-oriented nationalist elites in non-Western societies to balance Eastern essence and Western learning were believed to have been superficial; moreover, tradition and innovation now need not be mutually exclusive, but were to be successfully reconciled as a true sign of a nation’s modernity, and could be achieved without Western intervention. For Egypt, this was exemplified by

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128 "Japan...is the Eastern nation which lifted the head of the East and made sure that Easterners accepted modern civilization. It had been the pretext of the colonizers from England, France, and Holland, their feet firmly planted in the Eastern countries and skimping on expenditures to educate the peoples, that the Easterner differs from the West in his intellectual ability and his character, and that he does not benefit from European civilization. Then came Japan’s progress, disproving these allegations." "Al-Yābān: Dawla Sharqīyya Nakabathā al-Tabī‘a,“ al-Hilāl (1 November 1923), 10-11.
the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1920s. The charismatic Indian activist, Mohandas Gandhi and his nationalist movement emphasizing Indian self-reliance and non-violent civil disobedience against the British Raj resulted in Indian independence, which began to inspire a more universal anti-colonial solidarity in the world. Colonial powers could now be non-European (e.g. China’s invasion of Tibet in 1959).

Views of both colonialism and modernity among non-Europeans became more nuanced in later decades of the 20th century. Imperial Japan’s violent colonial actions in Asia in the first half of the century and up through World War II were finally and definitively revealed as having been contrary to the very principles Japan had come to represent for much of the non-Western world in the pre-war era. Nonetheless, in many regions not directly affected by Japanese occupation during the war (such as the Middle East), post-war Japan was rather quickly forgiven for its wartime sins and soon recovered its image as a role model for Eastern modernity. In the aftermath of the Second World War, unlocking the secrets of the “Japanese economic miracle” became the desire of many leaders and citizens of the newly established states of the Middle East. An abundant number of Arabic publications in the post-war period revisited Japan, this time as a nation that arose from the ashes of war and American occupation to become a global economic power.129

The final act in the story of a colonial triangle in Egypt is not the fact that a seemingly “non-aligned” universal anti-colonialist ideology did eventually materialize. It is that it emerged in its most globally assertive form in the aftermath of the Second World War, in Egypt, with the ascent of Egyptian revolutionary Gamāl ʻAbd al-Nasser to the forefront of Egyptian politics after the Free Officers coup in 1952 and the departure of the last British forces from Egypt four years later. His international status as political head of the non-alignment movement, the anti-imperialist “leader of the third world,” highlighted the era of global decolonization in Asia and Africa in which formerly occupied peoples identified with one another and often established direct contacts.