

GPJ

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
ON JAPAN

A Yearly Academic Journal

Nº 4

FORUM TAURI PRESS

Scope

“Global Perspectives on Japan” focuses on developing a global perspective on the study of Japan and Asia. The journal promotes innovative, interdisciplinary, inter-regional and transnational approaches to Japanese Studies.

The journal aims to be a venue for scholarship in E.M.E.A. region with a special focus on Turkey and neighboring regions. It especially encourages scholars from the Middle East, Balkans, Central Asia and the Mediterranean but also welcomes scholars from other parts of the world.

GPJ invites papers in the fields of history, humanities, and social sciences including topics of the past and the present. In addition to articles, the journal publishes occasional article size translations, book reviews, and surveys of current trends in Japanese and Asian Studies.

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON JAPAN (GPJ)

Publisher: FORUM TAURI Press

Osmanağa mah. Vişne sok. No:50 K.2 Kadıköy / İSTANBUL www.forumtauripress.com

Sponsored by: Toshiba International Foundation (TIFO)

www.toshibafoundation.com



Partner Institution: Japanese Studies Association/Japonya Arastirmalari Dernegi (JAD)

www.jad.org.tr



Editor-in-chief: Erdal Küçükyağcı (Ph.D.)

Assistant Editor: Jennifer Leigh Norris

Design: Ergun Kocabıyık

ISSN: 2687-6132

Editorial Board

Ayşe Selçuk Esenbel (Em. Boğaziçi Üni.), Oğuz Baykara (Boğaziçi Üni.),
Ali Akkemik (Yamaguchi Üni.), Altay Atlı (Sabancı Üni.), Ahmet Öncü (Boğaziçi Üni.)

National Board of Advisors (Alphabetical Order)

Murat Demircioğlu (Em.), Merthan Dünder (Ankara Üni.), Murat Dünder (Bahçeşehir Üni.),
Ali Volkan Erdemir (Erciyes Üni.), Hüseyin Can Erkin (Ankara Üni.),
Başak Koca Özer (Ankara Üni.), İsmail Özer (Ankara Üni.), Arzu Öztürkmen (Boğaziçi Üni.),
Ayşe Nur Tekmen (Ankara Üni.), İsenbike Togan (Em.), Mete Tuncoku (Em.),
Binnaz Toprak (Em.), Zafer Toprak (Boğaziçi Üni.)

International Board of Advisors (Alphabetical Order)

James Bartholomew (Em.), Sebastian Conrad (Freie Universität Berlin),
Carol Gluck (Columbia Üni.), Andrew Gordon (Harvard Üni.),
Kayoko Hayashi (Tokyo Üni. of Foreign Studies), Charles Horioka (Asian Growth Institute), Masaru
Ikei (Keio Üni.), Hisao Komatsu (Tokyo Üni. of Foreign Studies), Kaori Komatsu (Waseda Üni.),
Josef Kreiner (Em.), Hiroshi Mitani (Uni. of Tokyo), Li Narangoa (Australian National Üni.),
Ian Nish (Em.), Nakayama Noriko (Chubu Üni.), Sven Saaler (Teikyo Üni.),
Dominic Sachsenmeier (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen), Tsutomu Sakamoto (Em.),
Haruo Shirane (Columbia Üni.), Christopher Szpilman (Teikyo Üni.), Aoki Tamotsu (GRIPS),
Brij Tankha (Uni. Of Delhi), Suzuki Tadashi (Em.), Komori Yoichi (Uni. of Tokyo),
Shimizu Yuichiro (Keio Üni.)

GPJ is an OPEN ACCESS Journal allowing the readers download, copy, distribute, print, search,
or link to the full texts of its articles and to use them for any other lawful purpose. For more
information: The Budapest Open Access Initiative

Licensing Information

The articles in this journal are licensed under Creative common

"Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International" (CC BY-SA 4.0)

The journal allow the author(s) to hold the copyright without restrictions
and to retain publishing rights without restrictions.



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON JAPAN

No. 4



Table of Contents

Editor's Note

Erdal Küçükyağın..... 7

Abstracts 11

State, Political Parties, and the Nation: Triangular Political History without a Center of Gravity

Shimizu Yuichirō..... 15

An Ottoman Staff Officer in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905): General Pertev Bey's Impressions and Evaluations

Doruk Akyüz 36

Railroads of the Glorious Empires in the late 19th Century: From the Great Game to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5

Semiha Karaoğlu..... 63

Tracing the Royal, Romantic and Demonic Roots of the *Nio* Warrior Guardian

Jennifer Norris 90

***Yōkai* as the Edge of The World**

Kōda Retsu 甲田烈 120

BOOK REVIEW

Selçuk Esenbel 141

BOOK REVIEW

Can Öçalan..... 147

Yōkai as the Edge of The World*

Kōda Retsu 甲田烈

1. Introduction

Today in Japan, people show great interest in *yōkai*, and this interest seems it will not be lost any time soon. In the past, a ‘Yōkai Boom’ centered around Mizuki Shigeru’s original work “*GeGeGe no Kitarō*”, had spread throughout Japan, and in 2013, after the RPG “*Yōkai Watch*” was launched by Level-5 Inc., and its anime series for television was broadcasted the next year, the topic achieved tremendous popularity. In addition, *kaidan* (*yōkai* stories) which were transmitted orally until now suddenly became accessible on the internet and caused the creation of unique tales of their own. In this way, by continuing to encounter *yōkai* in some form or another, certain fixed images are formed in our minds today. In most cases, these images are of grotesque ‘things’ with a specific appearance like an ‘umbrella-shaped ghost’ (*kasa-obake*), a ‘painted wall’ (*nuri-kabe*), or a ‘haunting cat’ (*Jibanyan*). However, these popular images of *yōkai* are hindrances when engaging in academic research on the subject. Compared with the popular level *yōkai*, researchers’ definitions of *yōkai* are not uniform. For example, author and researcher Kyōgoku says “Handling *yōkai* academically is expected to be quite a difficult work.”¹ and indicates “I cannot see any meaning in trying so hard to unify different opinions.”² Furthermore, Tanaka, in his research on

Izumi Kyōka’s works, which he conducted from the perspective of Classical Japanese Literature, questions the suitability of the very concept of *yōkai*.³ We cannot deny the fact that defining *yōkai* is crucial for determining the extent of academic research. However, it is not something which we can easily reach an agreement on. Even a meta-level definition that attempts to combine basic aspects of various fields easily becomes blurry itself.

What I have mentioned above about the specific forms of ‘*yōkai*’ is merely a part of this issue. Can we not say that the lack of a common definition of ‘*yōkai*’, as opposed to the popular usage, might be pointing to a tendency for scholars to evade such usage? For example, if the meaning of ‘*yōkai*’ for ancient Japan differs from the present-day, then defining an area of study with that name and discussing related subjects with it might as well be problematic. By the same token, we cannot discuss ‘*Tsuka no Meidō*’ and ‘*Kuchisake-onna*’⁴ within the same category, simply because, while *Kuchisake onna* is a particular figure, *Meidō* refers to a certain happening. Also, it is an ongoing debate if the *yōkai* is a cultural creation or a phenomenon that exists in the real world. People who believe that *yōkai* are real insist that their personal experiences are *attaru koto*,⁵ meaning real occurrences, and tend to blame modern science to be too narrow-minded, whereas people who do not believe in *yōkai* try to interpret these occurrences as psychopathological or cultural phenomena.

Likewise, the condition of modern *yōkai* research is concerned with the meaning contained in the word itself, and the problematic debate around the phases of reality and unreality. Hence, the lack of methodological arrangements to resolve or tone down the clash of beliefs based on such differences in phrasing, must all be considered as factors creating the present condition of the field. That’s why the issue is philosophical in essence. In the preface of his book *Lectures on Yōkai Studies*, Inoue Enryō gives the definition of the field as “the field which examines the essence of *yōkai* and explains the phenomenon” (16:20), identifies three areas of study, physical, psychological,

* "This article is based on a study first reported in the International Inoue Enryo Research, 4 (2016): 156-173 ISSN 2187-7459". GPJ is thankful to the author and the journal for their kind permission for this publication. The article is translated by: Melis Akbaş, Ebubekir Arslan, Fatma Sena Azizoglu, Zeliha Çağlayan, Nurkay Erbay, Berfu Gülay, Gülşah İnan, Öykü Kaplan, Büşra Kuplay, İrem Gül Özdel.

1 Kyogoku Natsuhiko, *Yōkai no Ri - Yōkai no Ori* (Yōkai’s logic - Yōkai’s cage). Kadokawa Shoten, 2007, p. 24.

2 Ibid., p. 20.

3 See Tanaka Takako, *Kyōka to Kai'i* (Flowers reflected on a mirror and the mysterious), Heibonsha, 2006, pp. 27-33.

4 *Tsuka no Meidō*塚の「鳴動」: High pitched sound that is believed to come from burial mounds during earthquakes. *Kuchisake-onna* 口裂け女: A yokai resembling a woman with a mutilated face.

5 Here, “*attaru koto*” means the reality as conceived by the carriers-of-cultural-memory (storytellers). See: Matsutani Miyoko. *Gendai Minwako: Kappa, Tengu, Kamikakushi* [1] (Thoughts on contemporary folk stories): Kappa, Tengu, Spirited away). Chikuma Shobo, 2003. (Introduction)

and rational *yōkai* (16: 22-24), and discusses them in detail. However, it is hard to say that Enryō's research program was inherited by the later scholars. In his book *Discourse on Yōkai*, published in 1956, Kunio Yanagita had used the phrase "...(t)he origin of our initial steps in *yōkai* studies,"⁶ referring to Enryō; however, he also advocated the theory of *yōkai* as fallen gods,⁷ giving *kappa* as an example. Hereafter, philosophical studies have become almost extinct and *yōkai* has become an issue of cultural phenomena.⁸ As already mentioned, Enryō's *yōkai* studies were not inherited and examined any further. Following Enryō's death, *yōkai* studies have been passed on to the scope of folklore studies.

On the other hand, as will be discussed below, despite the current condition of *yōkai* studies, in recent years a number of scholars led by young folklorists show a new tendency to re-examine the notion of *yōkai* in line with changing world views. This paper aims to pave the way for a meta theory in *yōkai* research by shedding light on these studies of *yōkai* done by present folklorists and examining Enryō's *yōkai* concept critically on the basis of the Mutual Inclusion theory. In this attempt, we will not investigate the concept of *yōkai* with respect to the humanities, natural sciences or social sciences, but focus on the meaning of the very concept in an ontological sense. This study will hopefully show that *yōkai* can be defined as 'experiences on the edge of the world' as a working concept. Similarly, this work should be considered as an attempt to open a new path for philosophical research on *yōkai*, rather than a specific and concrete study in humanities, natural sciences or social sciences.

2. What is 'Yōkai'?

Komatsu gives a broad definition⁹ for *yōkai* in his discussion titled "What are monsters and *yōkai*?" within *The Great Encyclopedia of Monsters and*

6 Yanagita Kunio. *Yōkai Dangi* (Discourse on Yōkai). 1956. (Yanagita Kunio Zenshū (Complete Works), Vol. 6, 1989), p. 93.

7 Ibid, p. 93-94.

8 See Komatsu Kazuhiko. *Yōkaigaku Shinkō: Yōkai kara mita Nihonjin no kokoro* (New Thoughts on Yōkai Studies: Japanese heart seen via the Yōkai). Shogakukan, 2015, p. 12.

9 Komatsu Kazuhiko, "Kai-i - Yōkai to ha nani ka" (What is the mysterious: Yōkai?). In Komatsu Kazuhiko (ed.), *Nihon Kai-i Yōkai Daijiten* (Comprehensive Dictionary of Japanese Mysteries and Yōkai). Tokyo, 2013, p. 5.

Yōkai as follows: "(yōkai) are phenomena or beings which are referred with adjectives like strange, mysterious, weird, uncanny, causing anxiety." For him, "such occurrences or phenomena become *yōkai* only if they are thought to result from some sort of supernatural intervention".¹⁰ *Yōkai* are divided into 3 categories:¹¹ 1) *yōkai* as incidents (phenomena), 2) *yōkai* as beings, 3) *yōkai* with shapes. For instance, a mysterious phenomenon such as azuki bean washing in the middle of the night is called 'azukitogi' or 'azukiarai'. However, it doesn't necessarily mean a mysterious being is the cause of that phenomenon. First, there is 'the sound of azuki beans being washed', but as soon as the phenomenon is given a name, it appears as a *yōkai* in the 2nd category. Furthermore, if it is attributed to a shape or displayed in drawing, it then becomes a *yōkai* in the 3rd category.

Leaving the issue of *yōkai*'s existence/non-existence aside and defining it as 'supernatural' is highly regarded as a novel approach to Yanagita Ikō's *yōkai* studies.¹² On the other hand, Hirota opposed this view by stating "This type of *yōkai* conceptualization seems to be an ontological framework where all things are presupposed to fall into one of two categories (natural and supernatural)."¹³ and lines up with the carriers of cultural memory who do not question the existence of *yōkai*. He continues, "If we accept that the division of natural and supernatural changes depending on the socio-cultural context", then "we cannot assume supernaturalness as a self-evident premise when we study the *yōkai*".¹⁴ Nevertheless, with this stance, he was advocating a methodological agnosticism in which researchers should not question the existence of *yōkai*. In other words, the underlying assumption is that *yōkai* researchers would think "*yōkai* do not exist". Such a presumption inevitably limits research activity to mere empirical confirmation, hence, the impossibility of empirical research on the 'supernatural' such as gods, buddhas or *yōkai*, will obstruct further study on these topics. That's why, the

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid, pp. 5-9.

12 See Kagawa Masanobu. "Yōkai Shisōshi" (History of thought of Yōkai). In Kazuhiko Komatsu (ed.), *Yōkaigaku no Kiban Chishiki* (Basic Knowledge of Yōkai Studies). Kadokawa Gakugei Publishing, 2011), p. 50.

13 Hirota Ryuhei. "Yōka no Hitotsu Dehanai Fukusū no Sonzairon" (Yōkai's not single but plural ontology), *Gendai Minyōgaku Kenkyū* (Contemporary Folklore Studies), No. 6 (2014), p. 115.

14 Ibid, p. 117.

scholarly stance towards *yōkai* has become that neither existence nor non-existence can be proven academically. Yet, this approach is incompatible with the ontology of cultural memory carriers. As opposed to the *yōkai* research done so far, Hirota's point is appreciated because it introduces a philosophical perspective to the concept. On the other hand, although he labels his approach as "ontological relativism",¹⁵ and he questions the incompatibility of the ontologies of scholars and carriers of cultural memory, it seems he does not realize he in fact is questioning his own ontological framework. Similarly, even if this sort of relativism is questioning the ontological assumptions of conventional studies, it may as have drifted itself into the pit of 'anything-possible' relativism. There is no single correct ontological standpoint. The issue is not the relativity of ontology concerning 'yōkai', but constructing a metatheory of the 'yōkai' which obstruct the logic of relativism, by utilizing several ontologies simultaneously. When we think this way, Inoue Enryō's 'yōkai studies' provide us with hints to do that.

3. Ontology of the *Lectures on Yōkai Studies*

3-1. The Perspectivism of Enryō's Philosophy

What is the contribution of Enryō's philosophy to the modern *yōkai* research? In order to explain this, let us first give a simple overview of the basic stance of Enryō's philosophy at the time of *Lectures on Mystery Studies*, and then examine the ontology of the *Lectures* in that context. In fact, the characteristics of Enryō's philosophy as perspectivism, has already been pointed out.¹⁶ However, let us first look at the first edition of *Tetsugaku Issekiwa* (A Night's Talk on Philosophy) which dates back to 1887. In said book, which is comprised of dialogues, regarding the controversy between his disciples Maruyamako's monist spiritualism and Ryōmizuko's mind-body dualism¹⁷ professor Enryō comments as follows:

If you look at the mind from the matter, you will know that the mind is not in the matter. If you look at the matter from the mind, you will know that the matter is not in the mind. Including the birth of distinction between self and the "other", there exists no distinction whatsoever from the beginning. If you discuss the matter extensively, it becomes mind. If you discuss the mind extensively, it becomes matter. If you discuss the mind and matter extensively together, distinction disappears. When you discuss indistinction extensively, it becomes distinction again. If you regard distinction as indistinction, and indistinction as distinction then the two become one and distinction (between them) ceases to exist. (On the other hand) even if distinction is extinct, it still is extant, and (yet) though distinction is extant it still is extinct. This is the mystery of philosophy (1: 43-44).

This seems to be an elaboration of his phrase "reason contains and resides in the mind-and- matter; and the mind-and-matter possess the reason. The two are neither different nor separable from each other, but even if they are inseparable, it does not mean that there is no difference." (1:35) Here he states that the two phases differ. Firstly, the ontological standpoints of 'matter' and 'mind' are correlated in terms of point of view. If you look at the 'mind' from the 'matter', 'mind' does not look like 'matter'. This is because, when we discuss 'matter' extensively, 'matter' becomes something that is devised by 'the mind'. Consequently, it is equivalent to the fact that when we look at the 'matter' from the 'mind', the 'matter' does not look like the 'mind'. Hence, the theoretical foundation of correlated perspectives evolves into the form of 'The Theory of Distinction and Indistinction'. Let's separate 'matter' from 'mind'. When we do this, 'matter' and 'mind' seem like two distinct ontological categories in the sense that they are separable. However, the fact that they are 'separated' is perceived mutually by the matter and the mind, while the fact that we know that they are separable shows that these two concepts are, in fact, united without distinction. Enryō speaks to this situation by saying "Distinction is superficial (front), and indistinction is profound (back)"(1:45). That in fact is the 'logos'.

This type of 'matter', 'mind' and 'logos' perspective structure and its theoretical foundation is mentioned in his *Tetsugaku Yōryō* (*Essentials of*

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 125.

¹⁶ See Kobayashi Tadahide. "Inoue Enryō no Tetsugaku" (Philosophy of Inoue Enryō). In Takagi Hiroo (ed.), *Inoue Enryō no Shisō to Kōdō* (Thoughts and actions of Inoue Enryō). Toyo University, 1987, p. 34.

¹⁷ For such an interpretation, see Ogura Akihiro, "Tetsugaku Issekiwa" dai 1 hen ni Mirareru Inoue Enryō no Chūdō Tetsugaku (Inoue Enryō's Middle Way Philosophy seen in 'A Night's Talk on Philosophy' Part 1), Kwansai Gakuin Daigaku Tōzai Gakujutsu Kenkyūsho Kiyō, No. 42 (2009), pp. 70-74.

Philosophy) published in 1888. In the same book, it is argued that “Generally speaking, the development of human logical thinking begins with the dualism of mind and matter. Then, via materialism and spiritualism it finally reaches dualism once again.” (1:153) He then comes to the conclusion that “Mind exists but matter does not, or matter exists but mind does not, or neither mind nor matter exist, or mind and matter both exist, or a unity of non-matter and non-mind outside the mind-matter exists, or such unity does not exist... These are all parts of the same dualist theory.” (1:214) Enryō first relativizes the world image based on the ontological categories of ‘matter’ and ‘mind’ by changing it into ‘viewpoint’. He then establishes the viewpoint of ‘matter’ and ‘mind’ as the basis on which the relativity claim is established, and at the same time he relativizes it further by using ‘body’ and ‘logos’ which are different than the previous two concepts. The difference between “*Teksugaku Yōryō*” (*Essentials of Philosophy*) and *Tetsugaku Issekiwa* (*A Night’s Talk on Philosophy*) is that in the former, the search for ontological categories is expressed in a process of “successive logic” (1:212). With each category of ‘matter’, ‘mind’ and ‘logos’, such a high-depth philosophical standpoint can be said to have a meta quality. This is because it provides insight into the inevitability of each philosophical standpoint being held, and at the same time it bases its reasoning in the realm of perception.

3-2. The ontology of ‘Front’ and ‘Back’ in *Lectures on Yōkai Studies*

By the way, the definition of ‘yōkai’ in the *Lectures on Yōkai Studies* as “what is both mysterious and extraordinary”, and that “(d)ue to its abnormality and metamorphic nature, the logic behind cannot be conceived...” is not inconsistent with the concept of *yōkai* defined, for instance, by Komatsu. The point that “its logic cannot be conceived” maybe questioned though. Here, we witness Enryō’s perspectivism once again. His consideration of ghosts (*yūrei*) is thought to be the best example of his standpoint since Enryō personally regards ghosts as “the greatest among the popular *yōkai*, the chiefs of monsters indeed” (18:13). Below, his stance will be examined in depth.

When the concept of *Yōkai Studies* is defined as “opening the gate between life and death and illuminating the path to afterlife” (16:23), ghosts, who are connected to the other world, are inevitably established as central to the

discussion. Enryō starts with the origin of religious studies, elaborating on the essence of religion which might seem irrelevant to *yōkai* at first glance. He asserts that there are two different attitudes regarding the interpretation of popular religions: “emotional” and “mystical” (18:20). An emotional interpretation would aim to “merely appeal to one’s own emotions and make sure one believes in oneself without being misguided” (18:20), preaching that one should not doubt what they see or feel. A mystical interpretation, on the other hand, would argue that the essence of religion pertains to “rationality of irrationality” (18:23) and the untellable mysteries constitute the very core of it. However, for Enryō, it is impossible to claim that, between these two, “one is biased towards emotions, the other is partial to the mystery and between them there lies a middle ground” (18:23). After all, if one considers only what one perceives by emotions to be the absolute truth, it would be no different than reading a scripture and interpreting every word literally. Yet, languages and words merely help us express our infinite ideas by finite means, and hence, are rather limited. Therefore, Enryō criticizes looking at words and arriving at the conclusion that they reflect the truth as it is. He asserts that doing so would be just as foolish as looking at a cup of water and promptly deciding that seawater should be the same (18:24-25). As for mystical interpretations, we see that they attempt to cast aside all human intellect, not realizing that even such “denial of intellect” is a function of thinking (18:27). Thus, Enryō rejects the one-sidedness of both emotional and mystical interpretations. However, he does not support skepticism either, for it favours the power of doubt and disregards the fact that doubt functions thanks to the existence of logic in the first place (18:28).

In that case, what does Enryō himself think about religion? Before anything, it for him is “based on three major functions of the human mind: knowledge, emotions and will”. (18:29) These mental functions are “although finite from outside, they have infinite properties inside” (18:29). As I have stated above, emotional understanding of religion tends to accept whatever is perceived from one’s senses as absolute. We can say that this attitude is superficial all the way from the start. While others believe that mystic understanding can only be possible in relation with inner aspects (of religion). Therefore, Enryō develops his theory on the essence of religion, as follows:

In short, religion may deal with the infinite, or be built on the incomprehensible, as long as its phenomena take place in the limited realm of matter-and-mind, it awaits to be explained with physical and psychological terms. Even if its essence belongs to “rationality of irrationality” sphere, we must still try to give a meaning to it at wherever it intersects our boundless imagination. What I want to say is that just like attempting to explain the inexplicable space, we must make the inexplicable, explicable. Thus, the main objective of Yōkai Studies is to try to prove that in addition to physical entities, there exists a body of absolute incomprehensible entities. That’s what I mean by writing “getting rid of fake mysteries will open the way for the truly mysterious” in this preface. (18:33)

It should not be difficult to understand that here, “the absolute infinity and the incomprehensible” refer to inner, while “within the limited realm of matter and mind” to outer qualities. Enryō made it clear that while both emotional and mystic understandings of religion are valid, the former is limited by the outer world, and latter by the inner world. He proposes that only by combining these two, it is possible to achieve “getting rid of fake mysteries will open the way for the truly mysterious”. “Fake mysteries” refer to psychological and physical *yōkai* phenomena which belong to the *outside*, then the *inside* is the “truly mysterious”. Hence, Enryō’s ‘logic’ puts forth the limited nature of having a specific viewpoint, as well as the ontological thinking which helps locate the limits of its validity.

Then how can we explain a concept like ‘ghosts’ using this perspective? Enryō begins approaching this problem by questioning the birth and death of the soul. Those who believe that soul ceases to exist with the death of body argue that there is no such thing as ghosts and they are not inclined to ask how the soul functions while it is alive. On the other hand, those who advocate their existence tend to generalize the few ghost incidents to the whole. (18:34) Enryō suggests a differentiation between “apparent and obscure”. (18:35) It is like moving your hand. When you raise your arm, the force that activates it is not born out of nowhere, and it does not disappear when you stop it. The force dormant in your arm manifests itself once you start moving it and becomes obscure when you halt your action. Enryō likens this to a seed. If you put it in your desk drawer, it is unlikely that it will grow; but if you bury

it in soil, it probably will sprout. Thinking that ‘soul’ is similar, Enryō states:

However, if ‘self’, or the so-called “soul”, is nothing but the innate physical force or the peculiar power within; then the other world must be nothing but the world of this power. For this reason, we must understand that there are outer and inner, two sides to the matter. If we look from the outside, a blind world of forms takes shape, while in the inner side a lively spiritual world opens where the exterior and the interior intermingles. This spiritual world is called “the otherworld”. That is the realm of the inconceivable. However, if a person opens a part of the inconceivable world within his/her body, then, a way to communicate with the otherworld appears. This cannot be otherwise, it is nothing else but my spirit. (18: 150-151)

It is clear that this is the development of his ontological interpretations for ‘front’ and ‘back’ in his *Essentials of Philosophy* (Part 2), and that it is an extension of his discussion on the essence of religion. Enryō thinks that ‘matter’ as ‘front’ is blind, while a “peculiar power” is contained within the ‘back’. The expansion from the mysterious world of the ‘back’ to the ‘front’ is done in a way that involves the ‘front’, because there is always a ‘back’ in the ‘front’, and ‘the true mysteries’ lie at the back of ‘fake mysteries’. This is the structure for ‘front’ and ‘back’. By putting the religious view of the soul at the center of his discussion as “the main fort of the *yōkai*” (18:13), he was in fact following up his early philosophical program in the *Lectures on Yōkai Studies*.

4. From Mutual Inclusion Theory to *Yōkai* Studies

4-1. Mutual Inclusion Theory and Problems of ‘Others’ in *The New Philosophy*

As mentioned above, *Yōkai Lectures* had altered Enryō’s philosophy in practical terms. Then how about in his later years? In order to find out this, we need to take a brief look at the latest philosophical work, *The New Philosophy* and recently reprinted lecture *Shinriteki Yōkai (Psychological Yōkai)*¹⁸ which was

¹⁸ Sato Atsushi, “Inoue Enryō no Chōsen Junkō ni kansuru Shiryō – Shokuminchi Chōsen hakkō no Kiji wo Chūshin ni” (Documents related to Inoue Enryō’s conference tour in Korea: Focusing on articles published by colonial Korea). *Inoue Enryō Center Nenpo*, No. 23 (2014), pp. 165-168.

written in 1918 during his lecture tour in Korea, and *Shinkai* (True Mysteries) (20: 347-509) written in 1919, which includes his further views on the topics he had discussed previously. The content of the 'Mutual Inclusion Theory' is diverse. His discussions on various subjects like the place of *Hanshu Zanmai* (Pratyutpanna Samādhi Sūtra) in Mahayana Buddhism, or his confrontation with Nicholas Cusanus (1401-1464) draw frequent attention,¹⁹ but here, we are more concerned with the evolution of the worldview of 'front' and 'back' as described in the *Yōkai* Lectures. Hence, the idea of the Mutual Inclusion Theory is explained as follows:

In other words, when viewed from the outside, the world of mind seems to emerge from the world of matter and when viewed from the inside the world of matter seems to emerge from the world of mind. Anyone can easily understand that the world of mind resides in the world of matter, but when studied deeper, it can be seen that the world of matter resides in the world of mind. For example, our eyes are located between heaven and earth \ but heaven and earth is present within us, too. In other words, the eye exists between the heavens and the earth, just as the heaven and the earth exist in the eye, and the world of mind exists in the world of matter as the world of matter exists in the world of mind; we call this mutually inclusive relationship. This theory gained a so-called central status by integrating ancient lines of thought such as dualism, binary existence, interactionism or parallelism. (1: 342-343)

When looking at 'mind' from the realm of 'matter', 'mind' seems to be within 'matter', and when looking at 'matter' from the realm of 'mind', 'matter' seems to be within 'mind'. Enryō interprets this as the relationship between the outer and the inner worlds. Figuratively speaking, this is equivalent to the mutually inclusive relationship between macro and micro, in which the eye, like a speck of dust in the universe, simultaneously reflects the universe in itself. It should be noted that here, although it was not brought to the foreground at the time, Enryō had suggested a relationship between the self

and others. From an outsider's perspective, one's pupils would look like a pair of dots. They are a part of the 'matter' called the body, located in the two pits on the face. However, from one's own perspective, this small pupil immediately opens to a field of vision that includes the whole world, which in turn includes the outsiders.

Enryō's philosophy, right from the time of the *Dialogues*, was offering this sort of perspectivism, and sharply anticipating the presence of the outsider. This is because the difference between perspectives becomes apparent only with the presence of an outsider. This fundamental, endogenous relationship between the self and the other can well be regarded as the hidden basis of Enryō's philosophy in his later years.

Incidentally, *The New Philosophy* investigates the themes of "gathering all the results that can be observed from all directions" and uncovering the "truth of the universe" (1:286). Enryō first divides the direction of observation into "front view" and "back view", then divides "front view" into "outer view" and "inner view", and then continues by dividing "outer view" into "vertical view" and "horizontal view". (1:284) This 'front view' can be considered as the world of phenomenon in which 'matter' and 'mind' are correlated. The realm of matter can be seen from two aspects: its history of formation (vertical=time) and its structure of reality (horizontal=space).

First of all, the "outer view" as the "front view" can be seen along the time axis (vertical), but here, our subject is "cyclical world" theory. (1: 297) Evolutionists tend to talk solely about the evolution of the universe and life; but they avoid thinking how it is going to end. However, this is a one-sided approach. If the universe has evolved from a nebula, then there must have been yet another nebula before, and obviously there should be other nebulas from then on as well. The process of nebula evolving from nebula and returning to nebula repeats itself endlessly. If the immortality of matter and continuity of energy are accepted as a valid rule, we may conclude that this world has no end or beginning. Enryō states this with the words "cyclical eternity and infinity". (1: 313) In other words, the universe does not go through this process only for once but repeats its movement from nebula to nebula. The same holds true for life within the universe.

Then, what happens when we look along the spatial axis (horizontal view)? In space, there can be no power without matter. If we cannot talk

¹⁹ See Kawanami Akira, "Inoue Enryō ni okeru Shūkyō Tetsugaku Taikei no Taisei: Sōganron to sono seiritsu no haikai" (The greatness of Inoue Enryō's system for Philosophy of Religion: The Theory of "Mutual Inclusion" and the background of its establishment). *Inoue Enryō Center Nenpo*, No. 1 (1992), pp. 45-50.

about power where there is no matter, the relationship between the two must be “inclusive”. (1: 332) The smallest building block of the matter is the element. If the element has a form, then there must be other, still smaller building blocks that construct it, meaning this search leads to infinity. On the other hand, if we assume that the element has no form, then we end up with an awkward situation where “thing is born out of nothing”; Enryō says that if we are to unravel this aporia, we must treat the element through its “with form, without form, and mutually inclusive aspects” (1: 317). Now that “without form” here means “power”, matter and power have to be mutually inclusive. Likewise, if we assume ether has power, then matter and power have to be mutually inclusive. Therefore, we can state that “(w)hen viewed vertically, the universe is cyclical eternity; and when viewed horizontally, it is infinity”. (1:322) Furthermore, as we discussed above, via inner view matter is contained in the mind. In the ‘outer’ or ‘front’, matter and power, while in the ‘inner’, matter and mind are mutually inclusive. However, we must know that Enryō’s theory of mutual inclusiveness does not end here. When the view of the ‘front’ from the ‘back’ is concerned, a spectacle happens as follows:

As I mentioned before, if we remove the forms of both time and space from the main body of the universe, then the body merely returns to a “singular naught”. Within this naught, there lies the logos of the infinite mutual inclusiveness. In order to unravel this (mystery), one has to refer to the forms of time and space. The universe is but a great magic lantern. (1: 395-396)

Also, in the case of the ‘inner view’, he explains: “Infinite light must be shrunk into a single lightning.... It has to be known that a single molecule/a single element is stored within the womb of the universe, while at the same time, the universe-world is contained deep within the purse of a single molecule/a single element. This is mutual inclusiveness.” (1: 355-356) This is because ‘mind’ has the ability to grasp time-space in an instant. There, of course, the whole domain of the history of matter functions as its basis. In other words, within that instant, breathes the colossal universe. But even so, this again is nothing but a conception with the premise of time and space. When the viewpoint shifts from exterior (front) to interior (back), the form of time-

space turns into naught. Yet, neither time nor space exists. Still, since this universe (= world of phenomena) is a relative realm, it necessitates the form of time – space. Looking through various such forms, he states “*Everything manifests itself.*” Thus, he adds, “The universe is but a great magic lantern.” There are two points that deserve attention here.

Firstly, the viewpoint from the ‘back’ may not be called a ‘view’ point, since it rather depends on deepened firsthand knowledge, and it can be considered as different from the ‘inner view’. Moreover, firsthand understanding of this ‘back’ is explained as “This is it. This is it. Detached, you reach the *other-shore* (Nirvana) and unite with the absolute.” (1:385) As described, it is an unhuman breakthrough in the depths of self. In other words, the mutual internal relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’ emerges from this inhuman stance.

We must also pay attention to the fact that the ontology of ‘front’ and ‘back’, which was developed in the *Essentials of Philosophy* (Part 2) and further investigated in the *Lectures on Yōkai Studies*, was elaborated in *The New Philosophy* under the light of the concept “Mutual Inclusion”. In this respect, the mutually inclusive character of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ views under the ‘front view’, is folded into the ‘inner view’, and that too, is folded into the “singular naught” within the ‘back view’. Hence, we end up with a manifestation of a three-dimensional structure formed by worlds folded on each other.

Enryō’s perspectivism on this issue does not reject any philosophical point of view. On the contrary, he incorporates them as essential perspectives for interpreting the world and materializes his own earlier conceptualization. Well in that case, how does Enryō’s ‘mutual inclusiveness’ argument of his later years, relate to *yōkai* studies?

4-2. “Psycho-galvanism” and “Badger”

As it is mentioned before, “Psychological *Yōkai*” is the title of lectures Enryō gave in his last year during his tour in Korea. In those lectures, he dealt with three specific cases: ① Someone died at an inn in Mishima, on the way to Ise Grand Shrine, but suddenly appeared in his house in Kazusa, his hometown, saying “I’m back now.” ② A man left Kochi city as he was appointed to

a far county office and moved there with his wife and child. On his fourth birthday, at 12 o'clock, the man heard his child saying, "My grandpa died." Chatting with his friends in laughter, the man ignored his child's words. Not surprisingly, that same night, a distant relative came to visit him and told the man that his father had died at 12 o'clock that day. ③ After crossing from Niigata to Sado (island), a man was walking over the mountains on the way back to his home in Aikawa. Then he saw a badger beating on its belly in front of a roadside shrine and threw a stone at it in mischief. When he arrived at his house, he saw that a man that looked just like himself was having dinner with his wife. Then the 'thing' turning towards him said it came take its revenge and disappeared.²⁰

What all these cases have in common is that the *yōkai* phenomena take place beyond the common sense of space and time. However, Enryō in his *Lectures on Yōkai Studies*, interprets these using psychology. In case ②, comparing to the "telegraph messages" in the material world, he sees a "psycho-galvanism" in the spiritual world. For him, "those who are related by blood are more suitable to feel this psycho-galvanism", and "the 4-year-old boy was able to feel what had happened because he was in a state of pure calm (*kyoshin-heiki*: a condition where no insecurities or dissatisfactions exist)".²¹ In case ③, when he threw the stone, the man had the feeling "knowing deep in his heart that his act was indeed fearful", and "the feeling of fear was kept in his subconscious and transmitted to his family members as 'psycho-galvanism', causing illusion"²² is Enryō's interpretation. The way of interpreting cases like ② does not change only by using the term "electricity of mind" (20:500) for "true mysteries".

It should be noted that Enryō's interpretation of '*yōkai*' does not differ from the standards of the philosophical theory summarized in *Lectures on Yōkai Studies*. For example, the cases of "psycho-galvanism" or "badger" do not differ from the explanations of "possession by a fox spirit" with "the state of unconscious notions" (17:441). However, according to the standard of *The New Philosophy*, if you repeat the explanation of 'mutual inclusiveness' of 'front' and 'back', then it should be possible to arrive at a solution as follows.

²⁰ See Sato Atsushi, 2014.

²¹ Ibid, pp. 166-167.

²² Ibid, 168.

Indeed, when we think from the perspective of the 'other', any response that discriminates between space and time seems to be a mystery. This is because, in such a case, individual human existence within time and space is the underlying assumption. However, if we change our perspective to the 'inner view', we can see that time-space is folded into an instant. In this case, distance becomes irrelevant, because everything will exist within a brief moment. Then, the four years' old child must have responded at this 'inner view' level. It can also be considered that the 'inner view' yields unconscious notions. Furthermore, when seen from the 'back', the time-space present in the 'front view' is convoluted into a single point in which the 'psycho-galvanic response' and the 'badger' coexist. Suzuki has already focused on the affinity between Bergson and Enryō Inoue, pointing out that both base their research on spiritual ontology.²³ However, one wonders: is it not evident in we discussed so far, by stating that Enryō's spiritualism is biased solely towards the 'mind'? Unhuman ontology which relativizes spiritualism as a standpoint is the foundation of Enryō's philosophy. From this point of view, time-space does not only extend but also convolutes. At first glance, the '*yōkai*' phenomena manifest themselves in an ordinary world, therefore a careful interpretation of this convolution from various perspectives is the way leading to "True Mysteries", which in turn would help make it possible to clarify various cases regarding the "psychological '*yōkai*'. However, Enryō did not adopt "psychological *yōkai*" or "true mysteries" in the standard logic of *The New Philosophy*. Consequently, can we not say that Enryō could not update the tools necessary for unraveling a rich variety of examples because he had stopped his early philosophical approach to the *yōkai* studies?

However, criticizing Enryō for this would be like asking for the impossible. *The New Philosophy* is merely philosophical reasoning therefore, it is fair to admit that we should not try to bind it with *yōkai* studies. On the other hand, as I have already mentioned, Enryō had envisioned the *Lectures on Yōkai Studies* with philosophical methodology on its core. That's why we cannot really locate *yōkai* studies within Enryō's domain of thought. It is also true that any attempt to do an internal criticism of philosophical texts is reading and

²³ See Suzuki Yukari. Henri Bergson to Inoue Enryō: Shinreishugi wo Megutte (Henri Bergson and Inoue Enryō: On Spiritualism). *Inoue Enryō Center Nenpo*, No. 19 (2010), pp. 57-80.

understanding the philosopher's latent potential. In that sense, Enryō's *yōkai* philosophy in his later years can as well be considered as posing questions and offering possibilities for further logical thinking.

Conclusion: Towards a Metatheory for *Yōkai* Studies

The purpose of this paper was to attempt to understand Inoue Enryō's conceptualization of *yōkai* studies based on his philosophical activities, by re-questioning the concept of 'yōkai' in modern folklore and investigating its limits and potentials, especially from the perspective of Mutual Inclusion Theory" which is a part of his philosophical position in his final years. The study of 'yōkai' in modern folkloric studies which tends to explain the existence of 'yōkai' by a subtle ontological assumption of non-existence, has become inconsistent with the ontological theories of the carriers-of-cultural-memory. Therefore, the ontological premise of the concept of 'yōkai' must be re-questioned. However, this attempt must not end up with a relativism which is a result of 'everything is possible' cognition. It must reconcile various ontological viewpoints; but to do that, a pluralist methodological approach which can make them consistent at a meta level is necessary. In doing that, Enryō's conceptualization in his *yōkai* studies, of perspectivism in the correlated structure of 'matter', 'mind', and 'logos', as well as his philosophy of 'mutual inclusiveness' of 'front' and 'back', an idea he worked on in his later years, are all very promising.

We can anticipate that the *yōkai* studies will, without holding any bias towards a specific perspective concerning 'yōkai', and by making use of the world view of carriers-of-cultural-memory, eventually reach a metatheory of 'yōkai' research. As already pointed out by Enryō, the ontology of the carriers-of-cultural-memory is hampered by 'fake mysteries' and it is biased towards a single side of the issue, either 'mind' or 'matter'. Likewise, scholars are not exempt from this kind of bad habit, too. For example, as Enryō points out, a skeptic approach directed towards spiritual beings monopolizes authority by using 'skepticism', though it is nothing more than a one-sided perspective for understanding the world. However, Enryō had also not completed such an ontological reasoning. He had not positioned himself with a viewpoint like convolution of mutually inclusive time-space or matter-mind, nor did he

align with idea that accepts the *yōkai* phenomenon as the 'edge' of a world woven out of that viewpoint.

On the other hand, that does not invalidate Enryō's efforts to create methodological pluralism. When we look at the current fragmentation and the conflict of beliefs occurring in the research on 'yōkai' in humanities, as well as social and natural sciences, and the widespread interest shown towards the *yōkai* as a popular and spiritual phenomenon; there is no way to deny his contributions. It is important to realize that each perspective regarding *yōkai* is equally effective as a viewpoint with limits, and that it is not possible to explain everything from one specific viewpoint alone. Our attempt is to build a metatheory that utilizes all.

Here, taking over the concept of Enryō, we will redefine the concept of 'yōkai'. *Yōkai* is the edge of the world. In this context, 'edge' means the threshold of the world-conception possessed by the carriers-of-cultural-memory and scholars alike. In other words, 'yōkai' is any 'thing' (*mono*) or phenomenon (*koto*) which constantly threatens the world-conception of both sides. It is a phenomenon that awaits explanation by the correlated practices of a wide range of research activities and ideas built on a philosophical basis. If we continue to inquire up to this point, the inquiry will be reversed. *Yōkai* always invites us to depart from our academic and intellectual realms with specified purposes and continues its mysterious charm. Perhaps it is us humans who are being investigated by the *yōkai*.

Appendix

All citations from *Inoue Enryō-senshū* (Selected works of Inoue Enryō), 25 vols. (Toyo University, 1987-2004) in this paper are given as follows: The number on the left in parentheses indicates the number of the volume, while the number on the right indicates the page numbers. For example, (17: 125) shows Inoue Enryō-shū, Vol. 17, p. 125.

References

- Hirota Ryuhei, "Yōkai's Not One Ontology", *Contemporary Folklore Studies* No. 6 (2014), pp. 113-128.
- Kagawa Masanobu, "History of Thought of Yōkai". In Kazuhiko Komatsu (ed.), *Basic Knowledge of Yōkai Studies*. Kadokawa Gakugei Publishing, 2011, pp. 33-58.
- Kawanami Akira, "The Accomplishment of the Religion Philosophy in Inoue Enryō: The Theory of Religion and the Background of Its Establishment". *Inoue Enryō Center Annual Report*, No. 1 (1992), pp. 37-52.
- Kobayashi Tadahide, "Philosophy of Inoue Enryō ". In Hiroo Takagi (ed.), *Thoughts and Actions of Inoue Enryō*. Toyo University, 1987, pp. 31-58.
- Komatsu Kazuhiko. *New Thoughts on Yōkai Studies: The Japanese Mind Seen from Yōkai*. Shogakukan, 2000.
- Komatsu Kazuhiko, "What is a Mystery / Yōkai?". In Kazuhiko Komatsu (Supervised by), *The Encyclopedia of Yōkai in Japan*. Tokyodo Publishing, 2013, pp. 4-11.
- Ogura Akihiro, "The Philosophy of Inoue Enryō in 'Middle way Philosophy' Vol. 1", *Bulletin of the Institute of East and West Studies*, Kwansai Gakuin University, No. 42 (2009), pp. 69-79.
- Kyogoku Natsuhiko. *The Logic of Yōkai, The Cage of Yōkai*. Kadokawa Shoten, 2007.
- Matsutani Miyoko. *Contemporary Folklore [1] Kawado, Tengu, God Kakushi*. Chikuma Shobo, 2000.
- Sato Atsushi, "Materials on Inoue Enryō's Tour of Korea: Focusing on Articles Published by Colonial Korea", *Inoue Enryō Center Annual Report*, No. 23 (2014), pp. 125-208.
- Suzuki Yukari, "Henri Bergson and Inoue Enryō: On Spiritualism", *Inoue Enryō Center Annual Report*, No. 19 (2010), pp. 57-80.

REVIEWS