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Scope

“Global Perspectives on Japan” focuses on developing a global perspective on the study of Japan and Asia. The journal promotes innovative, interdisciplinary, inter-regional and transnational approaches to Japanese Studies.

The journal aims to be a venue for scholarship in E.M.E.A. region with a special focus on Turkey and neighboring regions. It especially encourages scholars from the Middle East, Balkans, Central Asia and the Mediterranean but also welcomes scholars from other parts of the world.

GPJ invites papers in the fields of history, humanities, and social sciences including topics of the past and the present. In addition to articles, the journal publishes occasional article size translations, book reviews, and surveys of current trends in Japanese and Asian Studies.

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日本における中国のソフトパワーとその限界—韓国のソフトパワーとの比較から—*

China's Soft-Power in Japan and its Limits - A Comparison with South Korea's**

Satoko Yasuno, Yasuko Enomoto

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the concept of soft power has come into prominence in the context of international relations as a device of forcefulness. The term refers to the power of a country that gains an upper hand over other countries through its attractiveness and cogency, which is distinguished from hard power obtained from military or financial superiority. American political scientist Joseph Nye suggests that soft power has three fundamental sources: the culture of the country (if it is attractive to other countries); the sense of political values (if it complies with those values both at home and abroad); and its foreign policy (if it is appreciated, and considered legitimate and ethically correct by the others) (Nye, 2011). It should be noted, however, that such conditions are only potential sources and cultural attractiveness, for example, does not necessarily ensure soft power. The extent a source effectively grants power depends on specific circumstances (Nye, 2004). Besides, it is argued that soft power alone is not sufficient for international

* This is an abbreviated translation of the following article: 安野智子&榎本泰子. (2020年) 「日本における中国のソフトパワーとその限界—韓国のソフトパワーとの比較から—」、文学部紀要 社会学・社会情報学、第30号2020年2月、(125 - 147頁)。The original can be accessed at the following link: https://chuo-repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail&item_id=13335&item_no=1&page_id=13&block_id=21

** Summarized and translated by Elif Alkan.

domination and influence, since a strategy of smart power (the combination of soft and hard powers) is required for ultimate success in practice.

Although soft power is subject to its own limitations, the authorities of foreign affairs in many countries have come to acknowledge the benefits of soft power as a part of well-set foreign policy in the long term. As for the East Asian political sphere, as particularly elaborated on in this paper; Japan, China, and South Korea certainly have abundant cultural and political resources to influence their neighboring countries, each having its past connections and currently getting in touch with other nations in every way possible. South Korea has one of the most outstanding and geographically extensive practices to exert soft power; while China has also recognized the policy of enhancing soft power as a national task since the Hu Jintao era, therefore making its public policies by considering the expected diplomatic outcomes.

China's soft power strategy is characterized by five means as follows: (1) the communist and socialist values as a source of soft power, (2) paying attention to enhancing moral values and improving the moral consciousness of society as a whole, (3) putting emphasis on Chinese culture and tradition, (4) motivation to expand into overseas culturally, and (5) the involvement of the ruling party and the government at the center of cultural activities in pursuit of stronger soft power (Kamata, 2010). An example of China's promotional channels in the name of soft power is the establishment of Confucian institutes, where Chinese language and culture are taught around the world. In Southern Asia and the Middle East, in such countries as Indonesia and the Philippines, China has a strongly positive image among people (Gill & Huang, 2006). However, China's efforts for the sake of attractiveness and international influence have not always been welcomed and celebrated abroad; due to the fact that Chinese organizations in foreign countries may also pose a threat as propaganda organs of the Chinese Communist Party, according to most of the host countries, primarily the U.S.. In fact, more often than not, the soft power strategy performed by the Communist Party in China is practically unsuccessful in today's world. The reason behind the backfire of China's soft power strategy might be explained by Nye's argument that soft power must be based on international credibility and thus should not spread any political propaganda by the government. Accordingly, the image of a

communist dictatorship limits China's soft power (Huang, 2013).

Although China has a great deal of potential soft power thanks to its long history and rich cultural background, along with deep-seated hard power provided by its huge population, economy, and military forces; China's global influence will not be as intended unless soft power is acquired effectively. Indeed, the negative impressions are observable even in the nearest Asian societies, such as Japanese society, to be discussed extensively. In a symposium in China, in 2015, Yasuko Enomoto presented the results of a survey conducted in two departments of the Faculty of Letters at Chuo University (namely the Department of Chinese Language & Culture, and the Department of Social Informatics). The survey investigated the image of China among Japanese university students, though the sample group of respondents was limited to the given university only. It was discovered that the students were familiar with such Chinese historical figures as Confucius, Mao Zedong, Li Bai, Lu Xun, and so on, but they knew very little about Chinese celebrities of the modern-day. Enomoto, therefore, introduces his first inference from the study, that the information about China is controlled by Japanese media and is biased due to political, diplomatic, and economical concerns. Another survey reveals that Japanese students tend to rather recognize Korean stars when they are asked about foreign celebrities, which implies that Korea has success in terms of appearance in Japanese media, unlike China. In this respect, China and Korea's soft power are worth examining comparatively.

This paper provides an overview of the Japanese impressions of China, compared to the impressions of South Korea, further analyzed by Tomoko Yasuno and Yasuko Enomoto through an extensive survey. The study seeks for answers to such primary questions as "What do Japanese people know about China and Korea today?" and "How does their knowledge affect Japanese impressions of China and Korea?"; while asserting a number of hypotheses and testing them according to the calculated figures acquired from the results of the survey. At this point, it must be underlined that the feelings of a foreign society toward a given country (the Japanese feelings toward China in this paper) measure the soft power of the country in question. On the other hand, the respondents' knowledge about and interest in China may or may not exert an influence on their impressions, which is to be analyzed through the

survey results. The survey conducted by Yasuno and Enomoto is a web-based one, with respondents of all ages.

The Korean and Chinese Images among Japanese People

When Chinese influence on Japanese society is investigated, it is crucial that Japanese history can not be embraced without taking Chinese connections into consideration. In fact, the culture of Ancient China and Chinese classics have always traveled into Japan and they fascinated the Japanese community. According to historical records, the books of the Three Kingdoms period (189-280) were commonly read during the early Edo period (1603-1868) (上田, 2006), and up until this day, Japanese youth society has been familiar with the history of Three Kingdoms through novels, mangas, films and video games (葉口, 2016). Furthermore, the Chinese scriptures including *Four Books and Five Classics* used to be an essential part of the Japanese education system, at least until the pre-war period. Japanese classics are indeed deeply connected with Chinese classics, and those Chinese classics have had a major influence on Japanese linguistics and literature; hence, Chinese literature and poetry are still taught in Japanese high schools.

While there is a great deal of interest in ancient China, Japanese people's impressions of modern China are currently independent of the historical bounds. Japan's Cabinet Office annually conducts its "Public Opinion Survey on Foreign Affairs" which demonstrates the impression of China and Korea throughout the year (see Figure 1). In 2018, a combined 76.4% of respondents answered that they feel "very unfriendly" (38.6%) or "unfriendly" (37.8%) towards China. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the impressions of China from 2001 to 2018, implying that the Chinese image in Japan has deteriorated since around 2003. Within those 18 years, there have been a number of events that have triggered negative feelings towards China. In 2005, for example, anti-Japanese demonstrations created tension; and in 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japan Coast Guard's patrol boat in the Senkaku Islands. A video of the latter incident was leaked on YouTube at the time, leading the conflict over Senkaku Islands to boil up. The impacts of such events are apparently reflected in the results of the public opinion polls. Moreover, Cabinet Office's polls are not the only resources suggesting the poor




Figure 1: Survey - “Do you feel friendly to China?”

impression of China in Japan. Another survey by a non-profit organization demonstrates that the number of respondents with a negative impression of China has never fallen below 80%.

However, the latest polls indicate that the Japan-China relations have significantly improved since the Senkaku Islands conflict, as almost 60% of the respondents answered in 2018 that the relations between the two countries were “good” or “very good”. In 2019 and the following years, the outbreak of COVID-19 might have caused a new shift in opinions about China. Pandemic conditions are, however, not included in this paper. It can be therefore concluded that until recently, relationships between Japan and China calmed down, albeit weakening.

South Korea, on the other hand, as discussed earlier, is one of the countries with a ‘successful’ soft power strategy. In particular, TV broadcasting and other content industries have significantly supported the national policy and generated substantial profits mainly in the Asian region, and gradually expanded to the rest of the world (高橋, 2014). In 1991, commercial broadcasting was reorganized in Korea, and in 1993, Kim Young-sam (the president of the time) fostered value-added cultural industries. The following year, the Department of Cultural Industries was established (沈, 2006). In the background of such movements, there were not only expectations of

the economic benefits that visual content industries would create but also a pursuit of inclusion in the international media competition where South Korea would be able to promote its own culture and enhance its global image. From around 2000, the export of visual content to foreign countries literally began. The demand for *Hallyu* content grew in Southern Asia, China, and Japan while the broadcasters of other Asian countries were suffering from a shortage of content for multi-channel broadcasting (沈, 2011).

The 'Hallyu' craze, which refers to the rising interest in Korean dramas and pop music throughout the world as figuratively depicted as a kind of (cultural) breeze, has also spread in Japan in the early 2000s. A number of dramas and K-pop celebrities have earned a considerable reputation. Apart from the increasing number of fan groups and a huge population of Korean-content consumers, the arrival of Hallyu in Japan has also drummed up interest in the Korean language, culture, and society. Based on a survey in 2006, it was reported that those who had been watching Korean dramas had a more favorable image of Korean people (斉藤 et al., 2010). The overview covered so far suggests that Hallyu effectively functioned as a means of soft power, at least in the early 2000s. If so, do Japanese people hold positive opinions about Korea, providing that Hallyu has achieved success? Further research reveals that it does not necessarily relate. In 2012, the relations between South Korea and Japan deteriorated when the South Korean president of the time, Lee Myung-bak, visited Takeshima, which negatively affected the impressions of Korea. In Figure 2, how friendly the Japanese respondents felt towards Korea in time has been illustrated. The number of respondents who answered "I feel very friendly" (and "I feel friendly") increased during the first Hallyu wave around 2003-2004 and the second around 2010; then sharply decreased in 2012. Since then, relations between Japan and South Korea have continued to deteriorate even after the government changed, particularly because of the *comfort women* dispute and former conscription issues. In the 7th Japan-Korea Joint Public Opinion Survey (May 2019) by non-profit organizations, only 20% of respondents answered that they had a "good"/"very good" impression of Korea, while 49.9% answered oppositely. The tension sustained, as in August 2019, South Korea announced the cancellation of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Such a pattern of conflicts is likely to lead to poor sentiments towards Korea among Japanese society.




Figure 2: Survey - “Do you feel friendly to South Korea?”

So far, we have surprisingly discovered that neither history and cultural heritage of China nor the well-known pop stars and dramas of Korea suffices for their soft power on Japan. This legitimizes Nye’s suggestion that whether something considered as soft power is indeed a power depends on the circumstances. Both countries are in conflict with Japan, including territorial and historical disputes. What’s more, anti-Japanese movements in China and Korea are often reported. Just like the concept of *reciprocal liking* in psychology, i.e. the tendency that if someone is liked by someone, they will like back; the course of international relations are highly affected by reciprocities too. In a situation where public opinions towards each other are mutually deteriorating, soft power will be limited.

Yasuno and Enomoto introduce two hypotheses deduced from the given overview of China’s and South Korea’s relations with Japan. According to the researchers, the interest in and knowledge of ancient Chinese culture does not necessarily correlated with a favorable perception of modern China; while the interest in and and knowledge of Korean pop culture might make way for a favorable perception of Korea (Hypothesis 1). Secondly, because the disputes and anti-Japanese movements are circulated through news, and political knowledge enables one to be more conscious of the disputes; exposure to news, media and political knowledge would have a negative effect on favorable perceptions of the other country (Hypothesis 2).

As noted above, Yasuno and Enomoto have worked on a web-based survey to test their hypotheses and the influential variables that lead to positive or negative public opinions. The study explores what respondents know about China and Korea, and how they think about them accordingly. The final number of valid responses was 1091, the composition of which is reported in Table 1 below:

	~19歳	20~24歳	25~29歳	30~34歳	35~39歳	40~44歳	45~49歳	50~54歳	55~59歳	60~64歳	65~69歳	70歳~	計
男性 人数	2	10	21	25	41	57	87	95	96	80	69	68	651
	0.2%	0.9%	1.9%	2.3%	3.8%	5.2%	8.0%	8.7%	8.8%	7.3%	6.3%	6.2%	59.7%
女性 人数	5	17	33	45	64	63	65	34	45	31	22	16	440
	0.5%	1.6%	3.0%	4.1%	5.9%	5.8%	6.0%	3.1%	4.1%	2.8%	2.0%	1.5%	40.3%
人数	7	27	54	70	105	120	152	129	141	111	91	84	1091
	0.6%	2.5%	4.9%	6.4%	9.6%	11.0%	13.9%	11.8%	12.9%	10.2%	8.3%	7.7%	100.0%

Table 1: The Composition of the Respondents

Just as the survey of Chuo University can not be expected to reflect the general opinion of all Japanese students, as the respondents are limited to the students at Chuo University, the respondents to the survey of Yasuno and Enomoto were not a representative sample. Hence, it is not possible to infer the distribution of opinions among Japanese people as a whole from the results obtained in this study. Rather, it illustrates the relationship between the variables (political knowledge, media exposure, cultural/historical interest, etc.) and the impression.

The basic categories of questions addressed in the survey are as follows:

- 1- Impressions of 16 foreign countries (also including impressions of Japan in the perspective of those countries)
- 2- Experience of traveling abroad, acquaintance with foreigners
- 3- Exposure to foreign and Western culture (frequency of traveling to the West, frequency of reading Western novels, watching Western movies and TV series, exposure to English, frequency of listening to Western music)
- 4- Exposure to Chinese culture (visiting China, learning Chinese, business trips to China, watching Chinese movies and TV series, reading Chinese literature)
- 5- Interest in China and knowledge of Chinese people, Chinese companies,

and Chinese society

- 6- Exposure to Korean culture (visiting Korea, learning Korean, business trips to Korea, watching Korean movies and TV series, reading Korean literature)
- 7- Interest in Korea, and knowledge of Korean society and celebrities
- 8- Media exposure (TV, newspapers, internet, use of social media, etc.)
- 9- Sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, education, income)

Along with China and Korea, the 14 countries are selected among the territories with the highest number of Japanese visitors according to the Japanese Overseas Travel Statistics (JTB Research Institute, 2019), and the countries with the highest number of registered population in Japan. Thus, the position of China and Japan in terms of soft power effectiveness in Japan can be inferred from a global perspective in results. The respondents' impressions of China, Korea, USA, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Russia, Germany, UK, France, Australia, Brazil, India, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore were asked, and the impressions of China and Korea (together with Russia) received extremely negative results (see Figure 3). Of the 1091 respondents, only 7 (0.6%) had a 'good' impression of China, while 44 (4%) had a 'moderate' impression, 268 (24.6%) had a 'neutral' impression, 397 (36.4%) had 'rather negative' impression and 375 (34.4%) had a 'poor' impression. As for Korea, 11 respondents (1.0%) had a 'good' impression, 38 (3.5%) had a 'moderate' impression, 204 (18.7%) had a 'neutral' impression, 276 (25.3%) had a 'rather negative' impression and 562 (51.5%) had a 'poor' impression. In addition, Tables 2 and 3 show the Japanese impressions of China and Korea by the age of the respondents. Chi-square tests demonstrated that the bias by age was important for impressions of the two countries.

The poor image of China might be affected by the demonstrations in Hong Kong, widely reported at the time of the survey (Hong Kong was asked separately for this very reason). Considering that a total of 40% had a positive impression of Hong Kong, with 7.8% having a 'good' impression and 31.0% having a 'moderate' impression, the reflection of the issue in the media as 'Hong Kong seeking democracy and autocratic China trying to suppress it' may have had an influence. On the other hand, the poor image of Korea may reflect the fact that the relationship between Japan and Korea at the time of

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


Figure 3: Impressions of the Countries among Japanese people (N=1091)

		Good impression	Moderate impression	Neutral impression	Rather negative impression	Poor impression	Total
Under 20s	N	2	5	33	30	18	88
		2.30%	5.70%	37.50%	34.10%	20.50%	100.00%
30s	N	0	6	43	68	58	175
		0.00%	3.40%	24.60%	38.90%	33.10%	100.00%
40s	N	3	10	61	96	102	272
		1.10%	3.70%	22.40%	35.30%	37.50%	100.00%
50s	N	2	5	61	109	93	270
		0.70%	1.90%	22.60%	40.40%	34.40%	100.00%
Over 60s	N	0	18	70	94	104	286
		0.00%	6.30%	24.50%	32.90%	36.40%	100.00%
Total	N	7	44	268	397	375	1091
		0.60%	4.00%	24.60%	36.40%	34.40%	100.00%

Table 2: Cross Table of the Japanese Respondents' Impressions of China and Their Age

		Good impression	Moderate impression	Neutral impression	Rather negative impression	Poor impression	Total
Under 20s	N	1	7	30	31	19	88
		1.10%	8.00%	34.10%	35.20%	21.60%	100.00%
30s	N	2	10	38	49	76	175
		1.10%	5.70%	21.70%	28.00%	43.40%	100.00%
40s	N	2	10	50	57	153	272
		0.70%	3.70%	18.40%	21.00%	56.30%	100.00%
50s	N	4	3	49	64	150	270
		1.50%	1.10%	18.10%	23.70%	55.60%	100.00%
Over 60s	N	2	8	37	75	164	286
		0.70%	2.80%	12.90%	26.20%	57.30%	100.00%
Total	N	11	38	204	276	562	1091
		1.00%	3.50%	18.70%	25.30%	51.50%	100.00%

Table 3: Cross Table of the Japanese Respondents' Impressions of Korea and their Age

the survey was at what could be described as its ‘worst’. It is unclear whether this was due to the timing of the survey, the method of the web-based survey, or the structure of the questionnaire, which asked respondents to compare more than one country/region, but results are open to a variety of further interpretations.

On the other hand, the majority of the respondents who have antagonistic approaches towards the two countries answered that the people of China and Korea has also unfavorable feelings for Japan. 72.5% for Korea and 57.9% for China believe that many people of those countries seem to have antipathy towards Japan, complying with the widespread perception that China and Korea are, in a sense, ‘Japan-haters’. Again, the theory of reciprocal liking might be substantiated in the results, indicating that the dislike towards Korea and China might also be because the majority of Japanese respondents assume that they are disliked as well.

Regarding the questions about the exposure to Chinese and Korean culture, whose answers would determine whether knowledge and interest are influential in the impressions, the answers are as follows (the results about Western cultures are excluded in this paper, as only China and Korea are analyzed elaborately): 13.5% of the respondents have traveled to China, while 24.8% have not but would like to, indicating that there is indeed an interest in tourism. As for learning Chinese, 8.8% of the respondents have tried learning it and 16.2% have not but would like to try, which means that about a quarter of the respondents have already learned Chinese to a degree or are interested in learning it. It must be highlighted here that the interest in Chinese is relatively high, even when compared to the interest in English. About Chinese dramas

	Tourist attractions in China		Learning Chinese		Business trips to China		Chinese films and TV series		Reading Chinese literature (including translation)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
I have experienced this	147	13.5	96	8.8	61	5.6	133	12.2	88	8.1
I haven't experienced, but would like to	271	24.8	177	16.2	94	8.6	136	12.5	162	14.8
I don't think I would like to experience	673	61.7	818	75.0	936	85.8	822	75.3	841	77.1

Table 4: Exposure to Chinese Culture

and literature, the combined total of “have seen/read” and “would like to see/read” reached 20% each. (see Table 4). Deductions from the data provided are already clear, yet they will be underlined again in the conclusion.

On the other hand, in the results regarding exposure to Korean culture (Table 8), 22.7% of the respondents had traveled to Korea before, 17.4% had “never been in Korea but would like to, 6.2% had learned the Korean language and 13.4% would like to learn. A total of 21.1% have seen a Korean movie or drama, and 8% have never seen but would like to see one, which altogether accounted for about 30% of the total, indicating the penetration of Hallyu content.

	Tourist attractions in Korea		Learning Korean		Business trips to Korea		Korean films and TV series		Reading Korean literature (including translation)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
I have experienced this	248	22.7	68	6.2	43	3.9	230	21.1	27	2.5
I haven't experienced, but would like to	190	17.4	146	13.4	77	7.1	87	8.0	122	11.2
I don't think I would like to experience	653	59.9	877	80.4	971	89.0	774	70.9	942	86.3

Table 5: Exposure to Korean Culture

Figure 4 below provides another set of crucial data, which identify the potential areas of soft power in Japan for China and Korea. The respondents were asked to choose among the options which they were interested in most about Korea and China respectively. Regarding China, food culture (26.6%), tourist attractions (23.6%), history (23.3%), and nature (16.5%) were selected most frequently, while pertaining to Korea, TV dramas (12.0%) were most frequently opted for, followed by food culture (25.3%) and tourist attractions (12.7%).




Figure 4: Interest in China and Korea

No matter how intimate they feel with China and Korea, the respondents were in fact interested in the countries. But were they knowledgeable about them? The names of 19 famous Chinese people, including historical or contemporary figures, were listed, and the participants were asked to select the names of those they had heard of. Not surprisingly, the respondents were most familiar with the generals of the Three Kingdoms. As noted earlier, it has always been well-studied in Japan and even included in video games. The finding that the Japanese know a lot about Chinese historical figures, but less about contemporary figures, is consistent with Enomoto's (2015) report based on a survey of students at Chuo University.

Subsequently, a variety of different questions were asked to evaluate the respondents' knowledge in the various topic, including Chinese companies, Chinese politicians ("Do you know who the current president of China is?"), and Chinese society/traditions ("Do you know which of the following is the Chinese spring festival?"). In each category, the majority of the respondents answered correctly. As we have discussed the influence of political knowledge on the impression, it is crucial to see that 72.1% of respondents correctly answered that the current president of China is Xi Jinping.

To measure the knowledge about South Korea, the familiarity with Korean celebrities was initially examined and the data were categorized by the age of the respondents. According to the results, there are many celebrities who are well known to people of all ages, while 1st, 2nd, and 3rd generation Hallyu artists are popular among the different age groups, yet almost every artist (or group) was recognized by more than the half of the respondents, which demonstrates their popularity, and the success of Hallyu penetration once again.

As for the Korean president, 74% of the respondents correctly answered that Moon Jae-in is the current president of Korea. Another question included in the survey is as follows:

"Please choose all of the following statements about Korea that you think are true." (1-5 are randomized).

- 1- There is no time difference between Korea and Japan (32.1%)
- 2- South Korea is still at war with North Korea (42.2%)
- 3- No woman has held the office of president so far (4.9%)
- 4- In South Korea today, it is difficult for young people to find jobs (49.9%)

5- The place where Japan and Korea have a territorial dispute is Takeshima (77.5%)

6- None of the above (7.6%)

The correct answers are 1, 2, 4, and 5.

Another idea to be tested was whether, in the current situation of growing conflicts between China, Japan, and Korea, the sense of belonging to Japan within the respondent may influence feelings towards China and Korea. Yasuno and Enomoto, therefore, included the question "How proud are you of being Japanese?". The results are as shown below:

I am... strongly proud to be Japanese" (27.9%), "fairly proud" (45.0%), "not sure" (20.0%), "not very proud" (4.9%), "not proud at all" (2.3%).

When all answers are handled together and the overall analysis is concluded, it is demonstrated that men and younger age groups are more likely to have a favorable approach. And the higher the respondent's income is, the more negative they are towards China. It is not easy to interpret the influence of sociodemographic characteristics, and therefore further investigation is required. In terms of information and media exposure, the higher the frequency of using the internet and social media on smartphones, the less the sympathy towards the two countries is. It is possible that this is a result of the influence of xenophobic content on the internet. In addition, the more strongly one is proud of being Japanese, the less likely they are to like China, which could be interpreted as a reflection of current Sino-Japanese relations, or an indication of nationalism.

What is interesting is that most of the respondents who are familiar with the ancient Chinese figures have less sympathy for the Chinese. It is difficult to interpret this result, but it may mean that those who are more interested in ancient China consider modern China (under the Communist regime) as something different from 'historical China'. Remember that Hypothesis 1 predicted that 'interest in ancient China does not lead to a sympathy for modern China'. The interpretation indicating that 'interest in ancient China leads to antipathy towards modern China' is highly plausible.

In addition, interest in the Chinese language, Chinese food culture, and Chinese nature had a significant positive effect on impressions of China. There was also a weak effect of interest in Chinese animation. On the other hand, knowledge of politics and culture was not significantly related to the

feelings towards China. It should be noted, however, that given that the overall opinions of the respondents about China were negative, the variable that showed a positive effect here may not necessarily increase their favorable feeling towards China, but may only have the meaning of weakening negative feelings.

A similar evaluation can be drawn about Korea: The younger the age, the weaker the negative sentiment towards Korea, and the higher the annual income, the more negative the impressions. Also, as in the case of China, the more the respondents are proud of being Japanese, the more negative they are towards Korea. Again, media exposure has a negative effect on Korean impressions. This may be due to poor relations between Japan and Korea at the time of the survey, which was frequently reported in the news. Knowledge of the Korean president and Korean society also showed negative effects, suggesting that the more they know, the less they like. On the other hand, interest in the Korean language, Korean food culture, Korean tourist attractions, and nature, weakened the negative feelings towards Korea. Interest in Korean idols was also found to have a weak effect. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1, suggesting that popular content associated with contemporary Korea may have an effect on national attractiveness (but still falls short for providing an overall positive impression and fulfilling the soft power strategy).

Conclusion

In this study, the following hypotheses were tested by means of the web survey: “Interest in and knowledge of ancient Chinese culture are not correlated with favorable attitudes toward modern China (Hypothesis 1-1),” “Interest in and knowledge of Korean pop culture are correlated with favorable attitudes toward Korea (Hypothesis 1-2),” and “Political knowledge provided in the news has a negative effect on favorable attitudes toward China and Korea (Hypothesis 2). The results of the analysis support Hypothesis 1-1 and Hypothesis 1-2. However, knowledge of ancient Chinese culture had a rather negative effect on the impressions of modern China, and the effect of knowledge of Korean pop culture was only significant when the perception of anti-Japanese opinions in Korea was disregarded.

Knowledge of Chinese society and politics were not associated with Japanese feelings toward China, while knowledge of Korean society and politics had a negative effect on feelings toward Korea. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was supported only for feelings towards Korea. In addition, according to an inference common to both countries, interest in language, food culture, and nature had a positive effect on favorable impressions of the countries, while being proud of being Japanese had a negative effect on favorable impressions of both countries. The perception of China and Korea's public opinion of Japan was also very influential.

The results Yasuno and Enomoto have attained suggest that the effectiveness of soft power (national attraction) is limited in situations where relations with the given country have deteriorated to an extreme degree. Although this study is exploratory, and there is much room for further improvement and reexamination of the survey objections and findings, it provides interesting findings for the studies of soft power diplomacy.

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