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Scope

“Global Perspectives on Japan” focuses on developing a global perspective on the study of Japan and Asia. The journal promotes innovative, interdisciplinary, inter-regional and transnational approaches to Japanese Studies.

The journal aims to be a venue for scholarship in E.M.E.A. region with a special focus on Turkey and neighboring regions. It especially encourages scholars from the Middle East, Balkans, Central Asia and the Mediterranean but also welcomes scholars from other parts of the world.

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「インド太平洋」地域外交に向けた日本の外交政策への提言*

Recommendations on Japan's Foreign Policy towards 'Indo-Pacific' Regional Diplomacy**

Tsutomu Kikuchi, Matake Kamiya, Yasuyuki Ishida
Japanese Diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific Region Study Group

Recommendation 1:

Following the international affairs trends in the recent years, "Indo-Pacific" has become important as a unified regional concept. Japan's foreign policy should go beyond the narrow perspective of bilateral relations and develop a dynamic "Indo-Pacific diplomacy" strategy by adopting a broader perspective that integrates politics, economics, and security.

In addition to regional concepts such as 'Northeast Asia', 'Southeast Asia', 'Asian-Pacific' and 'East Asia'; 'Indo-Pacific' is being formed as a broader regional concept connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. The reason for this is as follows: growing interest in maritime security, India's advancement and changes in its foreign relations (stronger economic, political and security ties with other Asian countries), expansion of the Asian economic sphere towards Myanmar, Bangladesh and India, and finally the distress on the security of maritime transportation routes caused by China's advance into the ocean.

* This is an abbreviated translation of the following article: 菊池 努・神谷 万丈・石田 康之。『「インド太平洋」地域外交に向けた日本の外交政策への提言』。報告書「インド太平洋時代の日本外交 ―スイング・ステーツへの対応―」。平成26年度外務省外交・安全保障調査研究事業（総合事業）（143–156頁）The original text can be accessed at the following link: https://www2.jiaa.or.jp/pdf/resarch/H26_Indo-Pacific/H26_Japanese_Diplomacy_in_the_Indo-Pacific_Age.pdf

** Summarized and translated by Selin Kütükçü.

Australia has already adopted the 'Indo-Pacific' concept in the official documents of the government, and benefitted from this concept in strengthening relations with India and cooperating with Indian Ocean nations. Until this event, the fact that Australia is not considered an Asian country, even though it is located in Asia, has been creating discomfort for Asian countries throughout the years. For Australia, the 'Indo-Pacific' regional concept will not only set the country free from its Asian roots, but will also support Australia's dynamic foreign policy as a regional concept that stems from its natural location. Australia is in the process of becoming the center of Indo-Pacific region from its former 'down under' (the other side of the world from China's perspective) position.

In India, whether or not to adopt the 'Indo-Pacific' regional concept is still being debated. However, if we look at the country's advancement in economy and security which is the government's focus on foreign policy (QUAD¹ or strengthening the relations with ASEAN countries), it suggests that the country is developing its foreign relation policy with this Indo-Pacific regional concept in mind.

China is hesitant to use the term 'Indo-Pacific'. A probable reason for that might be the US Republican security specialists, who are advocates of the vigilance against China, often associating their opinions with 'Indo-Pacific' regional concept. China's Xi Jinping administration's 'Maritime Silk Road' vision was aimed at combating the Chinese version of the 'Indo-Pacific' or the US 'rebalancing policy' with the idea to expand its impact area from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and even to the Middle East.

In Indonesia, many important steps were taken towards adopting the Indo-Pacific concept by the former administration. The current government of Jokowi has already launched its main policy with a national goal of transforming Indonesia into a Maritime Axis, to advance its development as a maritime state. Indonesia is currently developing its foreign relations with keeping its geographically strategic position located between the Pacific and Indian Ocean in mind.

Obama administration's 'rebalancing policy' is also based on the awareness

1 QUADrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) group is a response to a growing China whose economic and military might is causing instability to an already established international order.

that the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean are becoming one. The 'Indo-Pacific' region concept has been supported by Republican security specialists against China's expansion risk into the Pacific Ocean.

Japan will be required to make some policy changes on the Indo-Pacific region. It is especially important to determine geopolitical and strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific and take Japan's own national interests into consideration. A comprehensive, encompassing, multi-lateral approach should be adopted across all the departments of the government. For example, in the past, important measures were implemented to increase Japan's coastal security power. Even though improvements of warships were made and aircrafts were sold to various countries in the Indo-Pacific region such as Vietnam, Philippines and India, no cross-regional framework has been established. Instead of a division method by region or country, the first step should be implementing a comprehensive and cross-regional policy of "the intersection of two seas" proposed by former prime minister Abe, encompassing the whole Indo-Pacific region.

Recommendation 2:

Japan's strategic objective in the Indo-Pacific region is to maintain and strengthen the liberal, open, rules-based international order that has supported the peace and prosperity in the region for many years. In terms of security, policies should be established based on the principle of openness and stable use of the wide trade-areas and maritime commons that run through all the way from Pacific Ocean to the Singapore Strait and Indian Ocean to Middle East and East Africa. Japan must take confidence-building measures by establishing consensus among the aforementioned countries and encourage the coastal nations to enhance their precaution monitoring abilities. In this regard, Japan should further strengthen the cooperation with countries of the Bay of Bengal which are located in strategic locations in the Indo-Pacific and the South China Sea.

The strategic goal for Japan is to maintain the existing free and open, rules-based international order in the vast region connecting the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In order to achieve this goal, strengthening of cooperation with the relevant countries in the region is a must. In particular, it is important

to cooperate with countries in the Indian Ocean such as Australia, Indonesia and India which are democracies that share the same liberal values and ideas with Japan and the United States. Japan, along with its ally United States, should encourage the cooperation with aforementioned countries that value a free and open, rule-based international order.

The Indian Ocean is an 'international trade route' with more than 75% of goods transported to East Asia passing through. Even though there is no urgent threat on the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca might get affected by the conflict greatly, considering its strategic location. It is the maritime choke point of the Indian Ocean Trade Route and connects to the South China Sea. If a particular nation seeks to control the waters, the openness of the Global Commons will be lost and the maritime choke points will become unstable.

In order for the Indian Ocean Highway to be stable, countries with interests in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea (directly adjacent countries: India, Indonesia, ASEAN countries, Australia, China and also other countries with bigger interests including the U.S. and Japan) need to recognize the maritime region as global commons and develop a rule and consensus to ensure its stability and free use.

In addition, competition between major countries is likely to intensify in the Bay of Bengal, which is located at the western exit of the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, it is even more crucial to establish relations with countries around there such as Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Recommendation 3:

From the economic perspective, the decisions taken within the scope of TPP which aimed to harmonize and integrate the domestic economic systems of the countries concerned, and expansion to other countries should be implemented in this period as well and a conclusion should be reached. Japan should hurry to formulate a "post-TPP strategy" in order to maintain and improve a free, open and rules-based international order. After that, measures should be taken to encourage Indonesia and other ASEAN countries to adopt the measures that were discussed within the scope of former TPP (about relations with aforementioned countries, institutional reform, improving the human resources, etc.). Whether the countries will implement the former TPP decisions will probably have a decisive impact on the future of the Indo-Pacific regional order.

Asian countries have achieved a great economic success by opening their markets, actively introducing foreign capital and exporting products to overseas markets under liberal international order such as GATT/WTO.² While doing so, Asian countries that were sceptical about the free trade system once, have accepted liberal economic norms, including the principle of free trade. China is no exception to this phenomenon. It has gradually embraced liberal economic principles while maintaining the political system run by a single Chinese Communist Party.

The international liberal economic order, until the last few years, had the flexibility to consider the differences of countries and to value the uniqueness of each country with respect to the domestic regulatory system, while raising a code of liberalism. Therefore, Asian countries could participate in this international liberal economic order while preserving their traditional domestic systems.

However, later on, the decisions made on the TPP showed that the main aim was to form a "strong regional system" in which domestic regulatory systems of each country should be integrated rather than the "flexible regional system" in which national circumstances are considered as well. Therefore, Japan should actively encourage the decisions taken in the context of TPP back then to be implemented as soon as possible. It should also set out a "Post-TPP Strategy" to encourage the ASEAN countries to follow the decisions that was supposed to come into force with TPP and make efforts to create a free trade zone in the Indo-Pacific region. While doing so, Japan should be careful about the difficulties faced by the countries of the Indo-Pacific in the process of adapting to this new perspective that had come with TPP. It is not a good idea for Japan to have an image of being completely aligned with the United States, from other countries' perspectives, since the US policies sometimes might be too radical. While protecting its image, Japan should politely explain that the measures on market opening and economic system reforms in Asian countries that were a part of TPP will contribute to the economic modernization of the relevant countries and will ensure long-term sustainable development.

2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations.

Therefore, Japan needs to play a difficult but meaningful role in bridging the gap between the high demands of the United States and the reality of the Asian economy. Acting as an intermediary will ensure Japan to win the reputation as an independent and influential country in the Indo-Pacific region.

Recommendation 4:

In terms of the international relations in the Indo-Pacific region, it is important for Japan's diplomacy to deal not only with major powers, but also with other swing-states in the region such as India, Indonesia, Australia and ASEAN countries. The diplomacy must ensure that these swing states cooperate in forming a liberal, open, and rule-based order.

The important focus of the U.S. "Rebalancing Policy" as well as China's "Peripheral Diplomacy" and "Maritime Silk Road Initiative" is to consolidate ties with these swing states and to get their support. Trends in countries that have traditionally been considered as the "periphery" of the Asia-Pacific region are becoming the main focus that influences trends in international affairs.

As a leading power in the Indian Pacific, Japan should keep a close watch on the fluid power relations between the U.S. and China. However, Japan also must not forget to pay attention to the countries other than these two. The future of the Indo-Pacific is likely to be dominated by not only the U.S. and China, but also other countries as well.

One thing to note about Japan's Indo-Pacific diplomacy is that the ideal international relations concept in countries such as India and Indonesia (and most of the countries in the Pacific region) is closer to traditional nationalism in China, rather than liberal ideas similar to those in the U.S. and Australia. For example, these swing states' perception of the norms of the international economy, how international relations should be, the domestic political system and sovereignty, the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, are highly in line with the Chinese way of thinking. However, there is a deep-rooted belief among Asian swing states that they should overcome the traditional idea of national sovereignty and align with the liberal rules

and norms of the international community. In fact, ASEAN countries are still working together to build the 'ASEAN Community' based on liberal principles.

Japan should actively support ASEAN's efforts regardless of the problems that might come up in forming the ASEAN Community. Such a community is expected to contribute to the establishment of a liberal, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific order.

Recommendation 5:

As a response to China's "detour" strategy, more importance should be put on the Indo-Pacific diplomacy from now on. It appears like China has been working on adopting its "detour" strategy without conforming to nor challenging the liberal order. Japan should respond to China's attempts at performing its detour strategy by promoting a comprehensive approach that sympathizes with liberal international order

The first step must be concentrating on the urgent diplomatic issue centered around China-led AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). Institutions which have played a fundamental role in forming a postwar liberal international order; The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, should work on strengthening their response in a flexible and detailed manner, while also seeking to align with AIIB's international standards.

The terms 'power transition' and 'power shift' often come up when talking about international affairs in the Indo-Pacific. The reason is the rise of emerging powers such as China and India, and the relative decline of the United States' dominance. The main issue of the 'transition of power' in international relations is whether China will use its power for the benefit of the existing liberal international order or challenge the existing order to create a new international order. In other words, it is a question of 'conformity or challenge'.

It was hoped that the measures taken to incorporate China into the regional economic network and regional system would encourage China to align with the liberal international order and transform it into a responsible member of the international community.

However, does the debate on whether China will conform or challenge reflect China's real stance? It is important to note that the liberal international order formed after the war was flexible and has allowed each country to maintain its own domestic mechanisms. As a result, Asian countries including China became a part of this order to stimulate economic growth. However, the current regional approach does not allow such flexibility and calls for a strong sympathy for liberal norms and standardization in each country's domestic mechanisms. On the other hand, China is trying to build its own regional system by 'detouring' rather than completely challenging or conforming to the liberal order code. In other words, China refuses to conform to rules and norms if they're not desirable for itself, while enjoying the benefits of liberal order. Instead, China develops its own mechanism (in a loose liberal manner) and seeks sympathy.

Considering China's support for the economic development in Asia with the "New Asia Security Concept" at the CICA (Conference on Mutual Cooperation and Development in Asia) in May 2014, "Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)", it can be said that China does not openly challenge the existing international order established with IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Instead, they try to 'detour' them and create new organizations based on its own norms. For China, it is essential that the international free trade system will be maintained since it has been implementing the policies that benefits from the introduction of foreign capital and the export-led economic growth. Therefore, it can be said that China is a beneficiary of an existing liberal order but still is not seeking to change its stance on the defiance of the GATT/WTO and IMF systems that are the center of the liberal international order.

The '21st Century Marine Silk Road' initiative led by China may challenge Japan's Indo-Pacific' strategy. Henceforward, while observing the progress of the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road", Japan must make sure that the development of this initiative concerned with the maritime order will conform to the free and open rules-based order supported by Japan and the United States.

Recommendation 6:

In order to maintain and consolidate the involvement of the U.S. interest in the Asian region, Japan should dispel Asian countries' concerns on the U.S. involvement and persistent stance on the region through building up the Japan-U.S. alliance further.

Asian countries generally appreciate the Obama administration's 'rebalancing policy' however, some countries have doubts about the United States' involvement in Asia and demand its withdrawal even though the United States itself claims to be a "staying power" in the Asian region. The sceptical views of Asian countries on the US involvement have influenced their approach to China's policies and Asian economic and security issues. Japan should play a major role as a cornerstone for the United States' involvement because U.S. active diplomatic involvement is essential for the 'Indo-Pacific' to be perceived as a feasible regional concept.

The question is whether the United States can formulate a sustainable, consistent and integrated Asian policy that is in tune with regional countries, to earn their trust. In order for the development of a practical strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States and Japan should work together in developing policies.

Recommendation 7:

We should strengthen the regional system that encompasses the Indo-Pacific region by efficiently making use of EAS (East Asia Summit). First, the countries concerned should collectively put out an "EAS Leaders' Statement".

ASEAN countries should be encouraged to incorporate their principles on the "Code of Conduct" for the South China Sea into this Statement. The EAS Leaders' Statement on the Domination of the Territory and Maritime Issues should ensure political commitment that compiles with the peaceful resolution principles through international rules.

The EAS Leaders' Statement should include (1) solid arguments on EAS' position as the higher authority to discuss political and security issues, (2) set

out basic principles concerning the international relations in the Indo-Pacific region and reach a consensus on the rules and norms that countries should follow. Japan should also consider incorporating various measures in the Statement for it to serve as an alternative to the negotiations on COC (Code of Conduct) between ASEAN and China which is unlikely to be finalized in the near future.

For this reason, it is important to get the ASEAN support on the basic principles regulating international relations and Japan must consult with ASEAN countries that play a central role in the summit frequently. Some basic principles that should be included in the statement are as follows:

The countries should;

- Emphasize the importance of maintaining the order of the oceans, including the freedom of navigation stated in the international law.
- Stand up against using intimidation, compulsion and force to restrict another country's territorial and maritime rights.
- Urge the other relevant countries to clarify the basis for their claims of maritime rights according to the international law in case a dispute over sovereignty and maritime interests arises.
- Support the diplomatic and legal measures, including international arbitration, to resolve maritime disputes.

Recommendation 8:

Policies to build an economic architecture for the Indo-Pacific region should be formulated. In particular, Japan should support ASEAN's economic integration and stability, and build up economic relations with countries around the Indian Ocean.

Currently, ASEAN is in the works of a regional cooperation, therefore Japan's support will contribute to the stability of ASEAN in the future. Various Japanese companies in those countries are means to influence the Indian economy. In addition to India, Japanese diplomacy should also strengthen economic relations with countries in the Indian Ocean such as Bangladesh,

Sri Lanka, Australia, etc. through implementing measures to form “strategic economic partnerships”.

To form economic partnerships with these countries, Japan should strategically utilize ODA.³ In recent years, the ODA budget in Japan has shrunk, dropping to the fifth largest in the world by OECD⁴ standards. Japanese diplomacy should strategically utilize the repayable yen loan to strengthen economic partnerships with Indian Ocean countries. By investing in the infrastructure development in these countries, Japan would be able to promote connectivity.

Recommendation 9:

The India-Japan partnership should be strengthened in the economic sphere and Japan's importance should be implied through the process. Especially, Japanese government should make substantial commitment in helping to connect India with South Asia, South East Asia through “Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor” (IPEC) vision which is approved by the U.S. as well.

As long as the current international environment continues, Indian prime minister Modi's administration will maintain and strengthen its involvement in the Indo-Pacific and China. However, there is no guarantee that the international environment will remain unchanged. The whereabouts of US policy toward China and Sino-US relations will have a great impact on China's policy toward India and Sino-India. Since India is an influential swing state in the region, Modi administration could be likely to invest more in the Japan-Australia- U.S. vision of the Indo-Pacific, or they could also economically and politically lean on China more. For Japan, it is clear that the latter scenario is not desirable because of the formal Japan- United States alliance. In that sense, it is essential to first try to make Modi's administration become aware of Japan's importance in the economy realm that is on par with China. The closer economic relations with India are expected to contribute to Japan's

3 Official Development Assistance

4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

diplomacy and security in the long run, even if they are not profitable in the short run. Given that the Modi administration has agreed with the United States to improve connectivity through the “Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor” (IPEC),⁵ Japan’s cooperation and substantive commitment to this initiative are also required not just for the reasons stated above but also for the benefit of Japanese companies that is based in the ASEAN region.

Recommendation 10:

Indonesia’s Jokowi administration’s Maritime Axis Doctrine resonates in many ways with Japan’s Indo-Pacific regional strategy, which aims to maintain and strengthen a free and open maritime order. Japan should actively commit to both public and private efforts to support Indonesia’s maritime axis vision through various sectors.

Indonesia is the key country in Japan’s Indo-Pacific policy. Therefore, it benefits Japan for Indonesia to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific with Jokowi administration’s goal to make Indonesia a global maritime axis. Japan can support Indonesia’s goal by cooperating on maritime defence, or by strengthening countermeasures against pirates and maritime crimes. Support for human resource development in respect to maritime crimes is also important. In addition to providing short-term training at Japan Coast Guard Academy in Kure, Japan’s investment and assistance are expected by Indonesia for the development of marine resources and the strengthening of marine infrastructure as stated in Indonesia’s Global Maritime Axis Doctrine.

5 The “Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor” seeks to connect India with South Asia, South East Asia and East Asia through Myanmar.

Recommendation 11:

For ASEAN, Japan should promote a policy that regards the Indo-Pacific region as one economic zone. For example, involvement in the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multidisciplinary Technology and Economic Cooperation) should enhance economic connectivity between Southeast Asia and South Asia. In particular, a policy should be set out to reduce China's influence on "CLMT" countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) as much as possible by supporting their economic development to break their dependence on Chinese economy. Also, Japan and the United States should build strong ties with Thailand. The main aim of Japan's approach to ASEAN should be to maintain the basic elements for the formation of ASEAN Community.

Japan should first focus on the topic of economic architecture in its Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Policies should aim to promote increased connectivity within the Indo-Pacific Economic Zone or the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Getting ASEAN countries' support is vital for Japan's Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Therefore, it would not be wise to launch Indo-Pacific regional policy as an opposition to China since ASEAN countries are cautious about restrictive policies that put issues concerning China on the spot.

ASEAN countries put great importance to the economic ties of the Indo-Pacific (especially South Africa and Southeast Asia) and are trying to reduce their economic dependence on China. What Japan should do is to build strong economic connections between Indo-Pacific countries (especially Southeast Asia and South Asia) and reduce their economic dependence on China.

The next issue will be how to control China's growing influence on CLMT countries. In particular, the role of Thailand is important considering its strategic location. Japan and the United States should strengthen their ties with Thailand to increase their political and economic influence on the Southeast and South Asian regions. Thailand is an U.S. ally and has a deep economic relationship with Japan. However, the military coup in Thailand has complicated its relationship with the United States so it'd be fair to say Thailand is deeply dissatisfied with the United States. Therefore, Japan should form a comprehensive dialog and take measures to strengthen ties with Thailand by consulting with the United States.

In summary, Japan's strategic objective is to support the Southeast Asian countries' goal to build a regional community centered on ASEAN and make sure the rules and order of the ASEAN regional community are free, open and in line with Japan's expectations.

Recommendation 12:

Japan's major partner, Australia should promote stronger Australia-Japan relations from the economy and security perspective and encourage Swing State countries to adopt free, open, international rules and norms through trilateral cooperation (Japan-Australia-Indonesia, Japan-India-Australia, Japan-Australia- Myanmar).

Australia is Japan's major partner in maintaining and strengthening a free and open rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region. Close cooperation is elevated between Japan and Australia not only in terms of economy but also in terms of security as well. However, as China's influence on the Australian economy intensifies, some oppositions on Australia's close partnership with Japan and the United States comes to the surface with the concern that this partnership could complicate relations with China. Therefore, Japan should not fully rely upon Australia's support for Japanese policies. In the future, Japan should continue this cooperation and carry out policy discussions while keeping in mind that Australia's domestic politics may become complicated in terms of its cooperation with Japan.

Recommendation 13:

Track 2 dialogues should be actively carried out with the United States and other related countries in order to foster a common understanding of the desirable regional order vision on the Indo-Pacific.

The 'Indo-Pacific' concept became more and more important for Japan's diplomatic and security policies under the Second Abe Administration. In the future, Japan's diplomatic and security experts should actively engage

in Track 2⁶ dialogue with experts from countries such as the United States, India, Australia, and Indonesia to foster a common understanding of the desirable regional order in Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the Japanese government should increase its financial support for non-official diplomatic exchange and dialog activities.

Recommendation 14:

Necessary foreign policy and security policy tools should be developed so that Japan can play a sufficient role in building and maintaining the security order in the Indo-Pacific region.

It would not be enough to simply regard the Indo-Pacific policy as a new rhetorical or language expression. If Japan itself does not take the necessary action to build up and maintain the desirable security order in the Indo-Pacific, under the banner of proactive pacifism, based on internationalism, it will not be possible to demonstrate leadership on the region. To achieve this, the government must urgently prepare necessary policy tools, including developing military capacity centering on the Maritime Self-Defense Force.

Recommendation 15:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan should consider establishing a department that is in charge of the "Indo-Pacific Policy".

Up until now, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' regional policy initiative, the Regional Policy Division of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, has played an important role in going over the measures to encourage a cooperation between ASEAN and Japan, by acknowledging the significance of the entire Southeast Asia region, particularly the ASEAN countries. Considering the importance of the ASEAN for Japanese diplomacy, it is not a good idea to change the name of the Regional Policy Division. Instead, a new

6 "Track 2" refers to non-official diplomatic activities that facilitate confidence building and confidence resolution among states.

Indo-Pacific Policy Office should be established within the Regional Policy Division or the South-West Asian Affairs Department. Its function should be comprehensively analyzing and examining the politic, economic, security and military trends throughout the entire Indo-Pacific region.

Recommendation 16:

Japanese people should be educated on the importance of strengthening the relations with Swing States and overall “Indo-Pacific” regional concept which is a relatively new concept to Japan’s Asia strategy.

A country’s diplomacy must be broadly supported by the public opinion. In order to draw the ideal image of the Indo-Pacific for Japan and to make it a pillar of Japan’s future Asia strategy, it is essential to foster the understanding and sense among Japanese people that Japan belongs to the Indo-Pacific Region. To that end, the Prime Minister and other political leaders must step up their efforts to explain the public about the necessity and legitimacy of this new regional concept for Japan. The government should persuade the public on why Japan needs this new pattern of regional order through using prime ministers’ policy speech and even active media awareness campaigns.

Notes

This paper is a summary of the policy recommendations in each chapter of “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan’s Foreign Relations and Security Research Project”.

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