日本陸軍将校の見たオスマン陸軍とその実態 Ottoman Military Organization and the Japanese Military Reports

Abstract

This study introduces the military reports written by the Meiji era Japanese officers who observed the Ottoman Army between Russo-Turkish War to the Young Turk Revolution (1878-1908) and explores the Ottoman military organization based on Ottoman archival materials. Furthermore, it aims to reveal the contemporary images of the Ottoman Army with an in-depth analysis of its organization. Komatsu no Miya Akihito, Fukushima Yasumasa and Morioka Morishige; the three Japanese military officers who had observed the Ottoman Army, criticize it heavily, since they thought while its soldiers were competent for military services, its organization and command & control system was not operated efficiently. From the Russo-Turkish War to the Young Turk Revolution, the Ottoman Army had mainly served in the Unconventional War in Macedonia. Macedonia was the strategic destination for the Bulgarian Army, hypothetically the main enemy of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the Ottoman Army constantly increased the numbers of the divisions of the Third Army which was defending Macedonia. In return, the overcrowded Third Army started causing the entire formation of the Ottoman Army to lose its balance as well as coordination among its units. Excessive personnel numbers, complexity in organizational structure combined with a lack of a commander-general who could take independent decisions and coordinate effort was becoming the main threat for the Ottoman military affairs.